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INTRODUCTION 
The Life of Brownson 
Orestes Augustine Brownson was born in Stockbridge~ Vermont~ in 1803. A 
few years later his father~ Sylvester Brownson died~ leaving his wife with the 
burden of supporting a family of four small children. When Orestes was six 
years old his mother placed him. in the care of an aged couple in the neighbor• 
ing town of Royalton. He tells us that his foster-parents treated him. with 
great kindness and affection. and taught him the Lord's Prayer. the ApostleS' 
Creed and the Shorter Catechism as well as a few simple rules of conductc 
They taught me to be honest • to owe no one anything 
but good will• to be frugal and industrious. to 
speak the truth. never to tell.a lie under~ cir-
cumstances. or to take what was not my own. even to 
the value of a pinJ to keep the Sabbath~ and never 
to let the sun go down on my wrath.l 
But it is rather paradoxical to speak ot his childhood. tor as he says. 
he had none: "Brought up with old people. and debarred :t.'rom all the sports. 
plays. and amusements of children. I had the manners. the tone. and tastes ot 
an old man before I was a boy. A sad mistortune".2 
At an early age his foster-parents taught him to read. and he developed 
a great fondness tor it. Before he 11as eight year~ old he had read through a 
Protestant version of the Scriptures and had memorized a large portion o.f it 
lbetore he was tourteen.3 Thus religion was the cornerstone of his early life; 
the fond dream of his youth was to become a minister of religion and to ded• 
icate his life to the task of instructing others in the knowledge and the love 
1 
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of God. And religion remained of prime importance throughout his Whole life. 
In his effort to find truth in religion he embraced the Congregationalists 
and Presbyterians. became a Universalist minister and later a Unitarian min-
ister; he founded what was a tantamount to a religion of his own called the 
Society for Christian Union and Progress. and finally became a Catholic on 
October 20. 1844. He remained a Catholic until his death in 1876. 
Although we have no occasion to describe his religious experiences in 
any elaborate detail. a brief summary of the circumstances surrounding his 
conversion may give us some insight into his character. In 1836 he founded• 
edited. and wrote most ot the articles tor a. magazine he called The Boston 
Quarterly Review. In a comparatively short time his review became one of the 
most popular in the countryJ and by 'this time he had also gained a wide rep• 
utation as a lecturer. That his renown as a writer and orator made him one 
of the most influential men in America is evinced by the fact that Van Buren. 
tor example. attributed his defeat in the 1840 election largely to Brownson's 
essay on The Laboring Classes.4 Moreover his Novel, Charles Elwood, published 
----~----
in 1840• was reprinted several times in England.5 Thus. just prior to his 
conversion Brownson was a very famous ma.n in the full flush of youthful matu-
rity with a great career as a politician, writer and speaker lying open before 
Now in order to truly appreciate his conversion to Catholicism. we must 
remember that Catholics were undergoing a rather severe persecution at the 
time Brownson was most famous. Anti-catholic feeling was rather strong and 
Catholics were looked upon with a great deal of suspicion and mistrust by 
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their fallow citizens. Mobs rioting in the streets of our Eastern Cities 
burned several Catholic Churches. Thus, he had everything to lose, materiall 
speaking, and nothing to gain by' becoming a Catholic. And as might be expect 
ad, when he did become a Catholic it seemed to him as though the entire uni-
verse crashed in ruins about himJ but he accepted Catholicism even though it 
meant a complete renunciation of his past life. 6 He had to turn his back 
upon the things ordinary men hold so dear in life: Old friends, wealth, 
prestige, power. But without the slightest hesitation he continued his re 
recently changed to Brownaon•s Quar!erly Review, and boldly vindicated his 
stand. Instead of timidly claiming the possibility of baing a good Catholic 
and a loyal Aaerican citizen, Brownson asserted the impossibility of being a 
good American citizen without baing a Catholic. And it was because he so 
fearlessly sat forth his views on matters concerning the rights of Catholics 
that, as Daniel Sargent remarks, the bishops of' .AJD.erioa gave him credit for 
liberating the Catholic press in the United States.7 
But his religious wanderings do not evince an instability of character, 
nor do they indicate that Brownson was intellectually weak and of a vacillat-
ing temperament. He was by no means a mere intellectual weathercock who sh • 
ed with every change in the breeze of publio opinion. He was, on the contr 
firm in his convictions and would hold fast to what he believed to be true 
regardless of the cost involved. His adherence to the truth is shown first 
of all by the fact that he remained a loyal and devoted Catholic for aver 
thirt~ona years. His frequent changes before conversion to Catholicism 
demonstrate rather his sincerity and his willingness to accept truth wherever 
--
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' he found it. And his apparent instability in things religious is explicable 
only in the light of his burning love for truth and his willingness to make 
sacrifices in order to attain and defend it.8 
It is, of course, necessary to summarize briefly the philosophic back-
ground of Brownson. We may remark at the outset that there was nothing at 
all unusual about his early training in philosophy. Having been brought up 
among Protestants, and being interested in things philosophic .from his youth, 
it was quite natural for him to study the works of the philosophers famous in 
his day. .And so he read, among others, the works of Locke, Reid, Stewart 
and HumeJ nor was it unusual that he should be intluenced by his masters, aa 
he was when he professed the scepticism of Hume. 9 And since a great ~ 
famous philosophers of that time were French, Brownson became acquainted with 
some of them when he mastered the French language while he was a Unitarian 
minister (about 1833). .Allong the writings he studied were those of the 
brilliant Victor Cousin, who had a tremendous influence on him.lO And 
being interested in the French philosophers, Brownson also acquired a knowl-
edge of the writings of Pierre Leroux, from whom he borrowed muoh.ll But 
though he borrowed much from Leroux, Brownson never assented to his pantheis-
tic doctrine that man communes with God through humanity.l2 
Thus far we have noted, in general, Brow.nson•s philosophic background 
until the time of his conversion in 1844. Since his criticism of Kant was 
written prior to his conversion, we mention only in passing the :men intluenc-
ing him after 1844. As a Catholic he considered it his duty to become famil-
iar with some of the writings of the fathers and doctors of the church, 
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especially St. Thomas and st. Augustine; and for a time he was also a devotee 
of Gioberti.l3 For a time his works were almost completely forgotten, but 
it is extremely gratifying to note a revival of interest in him at the present 
time (see, for example, the recent biographies of Brownson by Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr., and Doran Whalen). Articles about him also appear rather 
frequently in leading Catholic periodicals,l5 and his name is mentioned more 
frequently in the Catholic press and by distinguished Catholic leaders. The 
late Reverend J. w. R. Maguire, for example, noted economist and arbitrator 
of labor disputes, spoke of him as "the most profound philosopher that ever 
treated .Perican institutions of government. His memory needs no monument, 
because there is no proportion between his mighty mind and mre monuments ot 
wood and stonen.l6 The Very Reverend Dr. Joseph P. Donovan, C.M., refers to 
him as the greatest thinker AJnerioa has yet produced, and as the Alnerioan 
equal and equivalent of Cardinal li8lllD8nel7 Daniel Sargent says of him that, 
as a master of forceful prose and as a controversialist he has scarcely an 
equal among English writers.l8 The distinguished Dr. wm. J. Bergin, c.s.v., 
former president of St. Viator College, says of Orestes Brownson that he is 
perhaps the greatest master of applied logic that ever lived. 
From the brief survey of his life given above, we may readily observe 
that BrOWJ18on has a claim to fame on a great any co1m.ts. The fact that he 
was born in poverty and reared in sorrow and yet rose to be one of the most 
influential men of his day, is an achievement worthy ot note. Having prac-
tically no formal education and yet reading Aristotle in the original "before 
he had heard on his upper lip" is another accomplishment of which few can 
boast. 
"He was counted an educated man; he knew passably the 
Greek and Roman classics, was not ignorant of the sci-
ences, had mastered most of the systems of philosophy, 
knew the languages and literatures of the principal 
modern nations of Europe, had studied more carefully 
than most scholars, ancient and modern history, theol-
ogy, and politics, without ever having been to college, 
except a short period at the Academy of Ballston." 9 
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These facts evince, if nothing else, his amazing versatility and capacity for 
knowledge. 
But in our estimation these extraordinary achievements obscure, rather 
than bring into bold relief, the true greatness of Brownson. In our estimatk~ 
any man is truly great only in so far as he dedicates his life, wholehearted!. 
and sincerely, to the attainment of a great and noble cause. If this be a 
worthy conception of "greatness", Brownson is a truly great man. For he 
consecrated his whole life to the search for and defense of truth.20 
He is also great because of a very remarkable ability to think clearly 
on any of the ma~subjects he treated, whether in the domain of philosophy, 
religion, politics, literature, or any other walk of human thought or activ-
ity. And therefore he is not to be condemned and summarily dismissed because 
he is not an "original thinker". He did not claim to have made any startling 
new discoveries in any of the various subjects he studied so thoroughly. But 
in our estimation his genius consists in the unusual ability to solve new 
problems in the light of eternal and immutable principles. And it is because 
he treated nearly every problem whioh arose in the light of its basic prin-
ciples that his writings are seldom ephemeral. And hence they are still 
worthy of serious consideration. 
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FOOTNOTES OF THE INTRODUCTION 
lBrownson• s Works Volume v. p.4 (Detroit 1882-1887) Citations hereafter are 
to Works. volume. and page. A chronological table is given at the end of 
the thesis. 
2works v. P• 4 
3"My reading was caa.ftn:ed principally to the Scriptures, all of which I had 
read through before I was eight. and a great part of which I knew by heart 
before I was fourteen years old" Works. v. P• 51 
'"In 1840. we supported :Mr. Van Buren. - though he has done us the honor of 
ascribing to us personally the principle share of his defeat, - tor then 
we regarded the contest as one of principle"• Works, XV, p.477 
5"Though written in 1834 and 1835• the book had not been published till 
1840; and its author, speedily growing diuatisfied with it, had peremptoril; 
forbidden a second edition in America, though it was reprinted several 
times in England". Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., J. Pilgrims Progress 
·(Bostona 1939) p.l41 -
6nTo pass from one Protestant sect to another is a amall affair. and is little 
1110re than going from one apartment to another in the same house. We remain 
still in the same world. in the same ~eneral order of thought. and in the 
midst of the same friends and associates • • .But to pass trOll. Protestantiu 
to Catholicity is a very different thing. We break with the whole world in 
which we have hitherto lived; we enter into a new and untried region. and 
we tear the discoveries we :may -.lee there. when it is too late to draw back. 
To the Protestant mind. this old Catholic Church is veiled in DIJ'Stery • and 
leaves ample ro01a to the iaagination to people it with all lllaD118r of monsters, 
chimeras. and hydras dire. We enter it• and leave no bridge over which we 
may return. It is a commital tor lite. tor eternity. To enter it seemed 
to me, like taking a leap in the dark; and it is not strange that I recoiled" 
Works, V, pp.l58-9. 
7iiJie had found the Catholic press in America literally in chains of timidity. 
He had taken oft its shackles. set it on its teet. The bishops, long before 
he died, had attributed the eaancipation almost entirely to hill.• and the 
praise which they gave hill. he could trust. for it oa.me from them singly. 
and those who gave it were not always partial to all of his views." Daniel 
Sargent, Four Independents. (New Yorke 1935) p.237 
~t men~t lack is principle. is the feeling that they should be true 
to the right; and that to be :manly is to be ready to follow the truth under 
llbatever guise it may come, to whatever it may lead, to the loss of reputa-
tion. to poverty. to beggary, to the dungeon or the scaffold, to the stake 
or exile. I have had "ll1Y faults, great and grievous faults, as well as others 
but I have never had that of disloyalty to principle, or of tearing to 01VD 
~ honest convictions, however unpopular they might be, or however absurd 
or dangerous the public might regard them • • .Sincerity in error is respect-
able; insincerity in the truth is of all things the most reprehensible, for 
it proves the heart is wholly false. a mass of corruption." Works, V, pp.46-7 
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9"tike most English and Americans of ~ generation. I had been educated in 
the school of Locke. Fram. Locke I had passed to the Scottish school ot 
Reid and Stewart. and ha.d adhered to it without well knowing what it was, 
till it was overthrown by Dr. Thomas Brown. lllho, in the introductory 
lectures to his philosophy. revived the scepticism or Rume, and drove me 
into speculative atheism, by resolving cause and effect into invariable 
antecedance and consequence, thus excluding all idea or creative power or 
productive force. Still young, I rushed into pure sensism." Works, V, p.l24 
lOnJn this halt-dreaming state, with vague feelings and vaguer notions, I 
encountered the philosophical writings ot Cousin, first, I think, in 1833• 
and yielded almost entirely to the witchery of his style, the splendor of 
his diction. the brilliancy or his generalizations, and the real power of 
his genius, although I made tram first to last certain reserves". Works, v. 
p.l25 
ll~e learned from him to substitute, intentionally at least, the ontological 
method of philosophizing tor the psychological, Which we had hitherto 
professed, and this was muchJ but, unhappily, we learned from him, at the 
same time, a vicious ontology, conducting, though we saw it not then. 
necess~ily to pantheism or nihilism". Works, I, p.215 Ct. also Works, V, 
pp.l28•9 for Leroux's influence on Brownson's doctrine that •aan lives and 
can live only by communion with what ia not himself"• 
12vide, no~eleven. Concerning Leroux's doctrine of communion, Bro'Wil.SOn 
says that he followed it in pe.rt, "but I did not and could not follow him 
in all his applications of the great principle he had helped me to grasp 
and understand. Re sought to apply the principle in an un-christian sense;" 
Works, V, p.l30 
liPrecisely haw much Brownson borrowed from Gioberti is still a disputed 
question. It is certain that he receiTed from him the notorious formula, 
Ens Creat Existentias, and applied it, but with certain modifications, to 
liiS own theory of kiiowledge. It was his defense of this formula that caused 
many to brand him an ontologist (For example, Bishop Turner in his Bisto!:l 
ot Philosophz, and also Father J. s. Rickey, o. Cist., Summula Philosophicae 
SCholasticae Vol. I, p.402. For a more complete treatment ot the relation 
~etween Brownson and Gioberti, Ct., America's Foremost Philosopher, Sidney 
Raemers. (Washington, 1931) pp.l6-19 ina ppe24•S 
15For example. Commonweal. Vol. 27. pp.719•2l. April 22. 1938J also Vol. 20 
pp.40-42. May 11. 1934. Catholic World, February, 1941; Ecclesiastical 
Revue. November. l938J Proceed§s i!_ .!h!, ..blerican Catholic Philosophical 
Association, 1931. 
l6America•s Foremost Philosopher. p.l6 
11Ameriea1 s Foremost Philosopher. Introduction, p.XI; Ct. also the following: 
~e have the justly ~d Belloc, hailed as the philosophic historian of 
the Reformation, but l'l(J attention paid to the fact that seventy-five years 
ago, America's limited oirole ot Catholic readers were keeDly perusing in 
the pages ot Brownson's Quarter~~ Review an analysis ot that piece or human 
retardation not less ~o?ound an not less eloquent" Ibid •• p.xll 
-
18Four Independents. p.23B 
l~tes A. Brownson's Early Lite. Henry F. Brownson. Detroit 1898• p.9 
20itHis predominant passion' • Isaac Hecker said of Brownson. 'was love of 
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truth. This was all his glory and all his trouble J all his quarrels • 
friendships. aversions, perplexities. triumphs. labors. A zealot for truth. 
he could not dally with lesser delights like popularity or wordly success. 
With so unswerving a purpose his lite became strong4illed and austere 
••• Brownson was a proud and lonely man. dedicated to his search and filled 
with a passionate honesty that never let him rest short of final satisfaot 
His heart consumed in this unsparing quest. he put private happiness 
well below his high aspiration. Financial security rarely concerned him ••• 
Though he walked on many paths that might have brought him fame or power ••• 
He always lett the traveled road to bruise himself in the thickets. Truth 
was an ignis fatuus. its small sharp flame burning obscurely just ott the 
beaten ~ut Bro1m.son had no compunctions about rushing from certainty • 




Brownson • s Approach to the Study of' Kant 
It seems rather strange that Brownson should begin a criticism of Kant 
with a treatise on the classification of ~stems. But the reason tor this 
is not far to seeka he maintains that it is impossible to get a clear notion 
ot arJ¥ system of philosophy unless it is known in its relations to other 
systems of thought. Before we can understand Kant's philosophy. then. we 
must study it in its setting; we must know its place in the general history 
of philosophy. In order to grasp his system firmly we must know something of' 
its causes and the extent to which it agrees with or differs from other 
systems. We must pin it down in its proper position in the history of philos• 
opb1• In short we ~t classify it. But if our classification is to be of 
a.tJ¥ val•• Br011J18on maintains that it must haTe its basis in the nature of 
science itself. The ground of classification cannot be the fancy or caprice 
of the historian. but must rest on a necessary principle of classification. 
Our first task. then. in studying Kant is to determine the principle llhereby 
we shall classify systems. 
Brownson tells us that modern historians of philosophy. especially 
Cousin. tend to olassit,y all systems of philosophy •according to the assumed 
principles of the P~ohological origin." He uses the term "Psychological" 
not in its modern sense. but as signifying a method of philosophizing which 
takes its point of' departure in the fact of consciousness. Those philosophers 
who begin in the subject or with an examination of human nature in order to 
10 
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explatnhuman knowledge are said to employ psychological method of philosophiz· 
ing• On the other hand those philosophers who take their point of departure 
in things or in extra-mental reality • employ the ontological method of 
philosophizing. Brownson ordinarily speaks rather contemptuously and dis• 
paragingly of the Psychologists and frequently condemns philosophers because 
they are nothing more than miserable Psychologists. Cousin. as is obvious 
£rom what has been said• is employing a false principle of classification 
when he attempts to reduce all systems of thought to their origin in con-
sciousness. 
Brownson rejects the view of Cousin that a philosopher must be either a 
Sensist, Idealist, MYstic or Sceptio.21 because the classification is inadeque~e 
for the obvious reason that there ia no roOJil in it for such men as Plato, 
Aristotle. St. Bernard and Abelard. to mention only a few. Its only value 
lies in the fact that it is a fair classification tor men such as Kant, Hume, 
Descartes. Locke, and Berkley who were concerned exclusively with the soienti11-
ic problem. 
But there were some philosophers who were not concerned exclusively with 
the problem of knowledge. And hence we must also find a principle aooordiDg 
to which the great Greek philosophers and the Scholastics may be classified. 
For there is a vast difference between the vain sophists and sceptics who 
begin to philosophize by calling into question the capacity of the mind for 
knowledge, aDd the ancients and Scholastics who attempt to explain the origin 
and ground of objective reality. Hence there must be two separate principles 
of classification for these widely divergant types of philosophy. Brownson 
would classify all systems of thought on the following basisa22 
I 










Bow since we are treating of Brownson's classification of systems merely 
as a preliDdnary to the study of Kant, we offer neither a defense nor a 
criticism. but •rely a brief 110rd of explanation. First of all Doctrines 
of Life are distinguished from Doctrines or Science because the chief concern 
of the for.mer is to render an account of the origin of objective reality. 
while the latter is concerned prilllarily with the origin and ground of science 
itself. 
The reason for subdividiDg the Doctrines of Life as he does followJ: If 
anyone attempts to account for the origin of things, he mnst do so on the 
basis of Plurality• Unity, or Synthesis. That is, it a philosopher maintains 
that life originates in plurality his doctrine will be Atheistic; (polytheimn 
is really nothing more than Atheism) • If he explains all things from the 
standpoint of~ unity, he must contend for Unityiam, i.e., Pantheism. But 
if, w1 th the great Christian father, we explain things from the viewpoint of 
Synthesis, our doctrine will be Trini tyi8Jll., or Theism in the proper sense of 
the term. Bow it is important to observe that, in order to have a true 
doctrine of life, we Dmat recognize God not as a mere unity nor yet as a mere 
plurality, but as an indissoluble synthesis of "Unity in Diversity, and 
Diversity in Unity,. as is shadowed forth in the very f'irst verse of Genesis, 
where the Hebrew name for God is a singular noun with a plural termination.•23 
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The true fountain of life is a Triune God. and a doctrine of life • it it is 
to be a true doctrine. must recognize the real. living. Triune God as the 
source ot lite; hence it one's notion of The Source ot life is limited to the 
conception of God as a mere unity he cannot arrive at a true -doctrine or lite. 4: 
But since mortal man cannot attain to a knowledge or the Trinity without the 
aid of Divine Revelation, such revelation is absolutely essential tor the 
tor:mation ot a true doctrine of lite. Therefore Brownson, as we shall have 
occasion to point out later• oaunot separate reason and revelation. but 
maintains that they are and liLUSt be substantially- identical. 
But to return to our explanation of the Doctrines of Science stated above; 
we must note first of all that Br01JJ18on retains the Sensist class of Cousin• 
but eliminates Scepticism. He does this because Sceptioimn does not imply-
a doctrine of knowledge. but rather a lack of one. Of the four classes of 
Cousin stated above we have lett. then, Idealism and Jfysticim; now Brownson 
maintains that these are much more properly terme:d Sentimentalism and 
Intellectualis~25 
Thus fer we have been concerned chiefly with Brcnm.son's mode of approach 
to the study or Kant. Whatever else -.y be said of his lll8thod• he certainly 
attempts to do a thorough job; for he undertakes first of all to iuvestigate 
the very foundation upon which Kant builds his philosophical edifice. He 
attempts to discover precisely wherein the Kantian system is rooted. and to 
understand it in its origin and setting in the general history ot philosophy. 
But influenced by Cousin's classification of systems and beginning with the 




similarities, he must find a place for Kant in one of the classes he has 
established. And so he tells us already that it is quite obvious that Kant's 
critic of Pure Reason is .anitestl~ a Doctrine of Science. At the very outse 
then, it is impossible for Brownson to admit that Kant can ever attain to a 
doctrine of lite. That is, Kant does not investigate the origin, ground and 
conditions of extra~ntal realit~. but he is a Psychologist who deals 
primarily with the question of knowledge. And since he is a Psychologist 
he begins his treat.nt of knowledge by an investigation· of the subject instea 
ot taking his point of departure in the object. Hence we are jutified iD 
concluding already that Kant is a Subjectivist and that he cannot conclude 
lidly to objective reality. For. according to Brownson, "no conclusion 
from the subjective to the objective ever ~et was valid." 
But another conclusion. aDd an even more important one is justified on 
the basis of the evidence presented thus far• Damel~. that Brownson cannot 
admit the validity of an~ Critical system. of philosophy; for there is DO 
oom in his subdivisions of the Doctrines of Science for a Critical philosophe • 
here is not a separate niche in his classification for "Kantian Agnosticism"• 
so Brownson must either reject the possibili~ of such a system. or be unaware 
t the real problem of Kant. But in order to discover which of these alter-
tives is DJOst plausible. we mu.st present. as clearl~ as we can. Brownson• s 
err of the problem Kant attempted to solve. 
Brownson maintains that the problem Kant attempted to solve was not at 
ll original with him. A great man~ philosophers before h±a had grappled 
th the same question and had failed to offer a satiafaotor~ solution. In 
15 
order to get a clear notion of Kant's problem. then, we must summarize brief~ 
the problem and the solutions proposed by Kant's predecessors. 
But here we are immediately involved in another difficulty. In order 
to see precisely how the probl8m of knowledge arose in moder.n philosophy it 
is important first of all to get a clear notion of what we understand by the 
term philosophy, what is expected of it, and its relation to Theology. For 
no rational discussion of any problem is possible without first carefully 
defining teras. And therefore by telling exactly what philosop~ can accom-
plish. as well as its relation to Theology, we lllight get some insight into 
the origin of the problem of knowledge. The origin of the problem of know-
ledge is perhaps interwoven with a false and vicious notion of philosop~. 
And thus we are called upon to formulate a proper notion of philosophy and 
its relation to Theology. 
Brownson re-.rks at the outset that philosophy 8.l1d theology cannot be 
separated and that &OlliS of the most pernicious errors of the day are a. 
direct consequence of the fact that modern philosophers do attempt to separate 
them. They contend for the independence and sutfioienoy of human reason and 
hence demand of reason that, in for.mulating a doctrine of life, it borrow 
nothing tram Revelation. With this view of philosop~ it is 8118.11 wonder 
that a great Dany modern philosophers deny Scholasticigm to be a real system 
of philosop~ because of its recognition of and dependence upon theology. 
Brownson of course denies that the fathers of the church were not philosophers 
He maintains that the great questions debated by the Catholic Theologians 
necessarily iDvolved profound ontological questionsJ and that the theologians 
16 
could not begin to express themselves without the aid of sound philosop~.26 
Not only is it wrong, therefore. to say that the Fathers and Doctors of the 
church were not philosophers. but it is impossible to have any worthwhile 
philosophy without religion. As Brownson puts it "We maintain with St. 
Augustine and John Erigena. the identity of religion and philosophy. Philoa-
op~ is nothing but the practical teachings of religion. referred to their 
ontological principles. and reduced to doctrinal for.ms. Philosophy is the 
offspring, not of doubt. but of Faith. and is t.possible in unbelieving eras.~ 
Now if philosophy and theology are .mutually dependent it is certain that 
philosophy will degenerate and collapse it separated froa theology. For 
since revelation is a matter of faith. it follows that philosophy is impossi~ 
in an age of unbelief. And thus it is that the breakdown in philosophy began 
when men doubted the authority of the church. This doubt has its roots 
deeply entwined in the revival of pagan literature in the middle ages. and 
in the triumph of heathen literature in the fifteenth century. The reason 
for this is obviousJ as was pointed out above philosophy needs revelation. 
~d since pagan philosophers were not in possession of the Divine Revelation 
in its purity and integrity. pagan philosophy does not and cannot have a 
true doctrine of Life. Hence as we imbibe the more freely of pagan thought 
the less clear will be our perception of Christian truth. lVhence it is that 
the influence of the Church decreases in direct proportion to the increase of 
interest in things non-catholic. 
The doubt concerning the authority of the church. more or less dormant 
in the fifteenth century, became in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
1"1 
an open revolt against the church; a great many people refused to accept her 
doctrines as true because they felt she had no right to teach. The revolt 
extended not only to the religious doctrines of the church, but also to the 
intellectual, social and political order founded and dependent upon the 
church. In its religious aspect, directed by Luther, the revolt is termed 
protestantantiam; in its political phase it becomes the supremacy of the 
state -- later the supremacy of the rabble over the church and state; the 
revolt against Scholastic philosophy becomes "what by courtesy we call 
"Modern Philosophf"•28 
This, of course, is an omen of ill for Kant. For in Brownson's Tin 
he marks a kind of culmination of the rebellion against the church, and is 
the consummation of a movement which is unworthy of the name philosophy. But 
to be logical and consistent Brownson must take such a view, because it 
follows necessarily from his very notion of philosophy and ita relation to 
theology (as was explained above) • And so at the very beginn1 ng Brownson 
is convinced that Kant is wrong and must be refuted.29 
But if Kant•s philosophy, as well as the whole of modern philosophy, be• 
gan in a revolt, a rebellion against tradition, we must ask Why it rebels. 
lhat is the basis and foundation of its revolt? On what possible ground 
can it justify an open break with the schoolmen? 
There is only one possible answer to the above questions. For ~en men, 
because of the iD.flux of things non-catholic, became dissatisfied with the 
church and refused to recognize her as an authority, this rebellion could be 
justified only on the basis of pure reason alone. For it seems quite obvious 
~-·----------------------------------~ 
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that no one could justify a rebellion against the church on the ground of 
~ possible tradition or authority. And hence reason alone must be supreme. 
Modern philosophy would summon the Scholastics before the tribunal of reason 
and demand of them that they render an account of their works. Reason would 
be the court of last resort; it would place even Divine Revelation on trial • 
. tnd hence modern philosophy began by turning its back upon the great heritage 
ot the past and attempted to construct philosophy anew upon the bedrock ot 
reason alone - the only imperishable basis tor ~ philosophy • 
.And thus it is that the starting point ot Descartes was in complete and 
open doubt, revolt, rebellion, for that was the starting point of his age; 
nothing worthwhile in philosophy remains. He must reconstruct the whole 
edifice. He concedes not a single thing to be proved, not even his own 
existence nor his ability to know. And hence he must propose questions such 
as, "Can I know? Haw do I know that 1fll' knowledge is valid?" But the only 
way Descartes can remove doubt is by knowledge. The validity of kncnrledge, 
then, is the first thing to be established in order to remove this universal 
doubt. 
Descartes attempts to answer his problem by means ot his notorious 
enthymene • Cogi to, ergo .!!!- ! think, is a fact so clear, so evident, so 
absolutely certain that I cannot doubt it. Even awareness of '1113' own existence 
depends upon thought because I am able to recognize that I exist only in 
thought. But that, according to Brownson, does not solve the problea of 
establishing the validity of knowledge. For, how do I knaw that I think? 
If thought is "llf3' authority for affirming m:::1 existence, on what authorit7 do 
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1 affirm that I think? It I attir.m thought on the authority of consciousness. 
bOW affirm consciousness and how establish its reliability? It Descartes 
refuses to take knowledge tor granted. why does he take thought tor granted 
and why ass\DIIS its n.lidity1 But Descartes does not attempt to prove the 
trustworthiness of consciousness. and hsnce he does not prove what he set out 
to establish. Rather he abandoned his origiD.al problem of knowledge without 
solving it, and thus leaves it to be solved by' his successors. 
While Brownson admits the Cartesian enthymeme to be detective as an 
argumnt. he dismisses objections to it on that ground because they miss the 
pointJ Descartes never uant his formula to be an argument or a strict demon-
stration. Be merely intends it to show that we recognise in the tact ot th 
not only that we think, but also that we persist as a thinking subject. But. 
he argues. it 1 attira my existence because I am able to recognize it distinct 
ly in thought. why not apply that criterion of certitude to objects outside 
self? The reality of objects, therefore. is evinced on the basis of whether 
or not I can conceive them. clearly. And having determined this, "nothing 
is more easy•" says Brownson,"'chan to construct his theory of the universe. 
1 rests on the original conceptions of the subject. given in the atti.rmatian 
I ~ Proceed with these as in the construction ot the science or geometr.y. 
and you will arrive, with mathematical certainty, to a doctrine of Lite". 30 
According to Brownson, however • this Cartesian analysis presents only 
a partial truth. which is. that subjective existence is recognized in thought. 
ut Brownson maintains that in every thought there is toW1d not only the 
thinking subject. but also SGIII8 object or thing about which we thinkJ and that 
~----------------------------~ 
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object mnst be distinct fro• the thinking subject.31 Subject and object are 
indissolubly united in every thought. and an analysis (so to speak) of thought 
gives us both subject and that which is distinct from it• the object. But 
instead of analysing thought so as to discover in the fact or thought itself 
both subjective and objective existence. Descartes first ot all oonoluded 
trom thought to the reality of a thinking subject. Then, from the idea in 
the subject he attempted to pass to extra-mental reality. And hence he 
concluded from subjective to objective existence. tram the idea to objective 
reality. But his conclusion is invalid "because no passage from subject to 
object ever yet was valid." 
Brownson has a rather lengthy treatment of Descartes beoauae he consider• 
ed him to be a kiDd ot souroe from which a great lllaJ1Y errors stelll'll8de And 
• 
so. after Descartes established a problsm and failed to solve it. Brownson 
traces that problem in Desoartes•·suooessorJJ in order to understand the exact 
status ot the problem. at the time of Kant. And therefore we mnst consider. 
even though briefly. Brownson's estimation of Bacon., Hobbes. Looke• and Hume. 
Our mxt task, then. is to examine and to classify the doctrines ot 
Francis Bacon. Brownson maintai.Ds that Bacon is very much overrated~ he 
founded neither a school ot philosophy. nor had he any famous disciples. For 
Brownson maintains that "1'o talk of Baconian philosophy • save in deference 
o common usage, is to betray our ignoranoe.•32 Neither has Brownson a very 
gh opinion of his so -called inductive method a "Nothing seems to us more 
inoonolusive, less scientific• than what Bacon says about Induction, 
ess it be What Englishaen and Americans say·atter hia• and professedly in 
21 
his spirit".33 The most that can be said tor the Baoonian method is that 
it attains to a classification ot isolated facts, and hence is not scientific 
For science is a knowledge ot things in their principles and causes. or in 
the Platonic system, a knowledge of the idea. His method has a certain 
validity in law. but is not ot much Talue elsewhere. Insofar as the inducti'VI 
method is Talid, it is the method ot the human mind i tselt and Bacon neither 
established its Talidity- as a method nor made any startling adva.noes as to 
its use.34 
To classity' Bacon, then, is a rather difficult task for he contributed 
neither a body ot doctrine nor a method of philosophizing. The best that 
'IIIAY' be said for him. is that he exerted an influence on his contemporaries. 
And because his method was applicable only to the classification ot sensible 
phenomena, he was, from the standpoint of the intluenoe he exerted• primarily 
a Sensist. And therefore, even though he believed in the suprasensible, 
Bacon must be classed as a Sensist. 
Hobbes, who is sometimes unjustly referred to as a tellower ot Bacon, 
s the next name worthy ot •ntion. Although he is also a Sensist, for he 
ecognized no order ot knowledge abO'VIe sense knowledge, he is, as a thinker, 
stly superior to either Descartes or Bacon. But since Hobbes is generally 
IWl1 through his disciple, Locke, it is unnecessary to say much about him 
ere. We mention only in passing that Brownson maintains that his political 
octrines give us a poor picture o£ Hobbes, the man; according to Brownson 
e was really quite a philanthropist.35 
As we mentioned above, Locke, is nothing more than a satellite ot Hobbes. 
~--------------------------~ 
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He is a sort ot Hobbes made ea~. or. as Brownson so neatly puts it. "Hobbes 
.-de palatable. and tit to be served up to respectable people." Like his 
predecessors. Desoartes and Hobbes. Locke is nothing more than a miserable 
psychologist. That is. he is conoerned primarily with the origin and ground 
ot human science rather with a Doctrine of Lite. He therefore takes his 
point of departure in the subjeot. attempting to investigate the understand• 
iDg in order to see how it works. He thus seeks to unravel problems suoh 
asa How does the understanding workt How om I be certain that I knowt 
His answers to these questions prove that he is a Sensist. His doctrine 
might very well be tormulateda Sentio• erfiO SUIRJ or. applied to the object• 
Sentio. er o est. (Vol.I. P• 160) Although he contends tor the reality ot 
intellectual knowledge. he oan do so only at the expense of logioal oonsiste 
For the premises from whioh he begins can lead to nothing more tllan a Sensist 
interpretation of reality. as Hums and Berkley have demonstrated. 
As for Hum.e and Berkley. we note briefl7 that Brownson maintains that 
hey have acopeted Looke' s premises and demonstrated the absurdity of trying 
explain science on the basis of Sensism.. Although at this time he did not 
ve a very high opinion of Hums• 36 he oredi ts Hum.e with showing that. if 
sensist philosophy in vogue in his day be aooepted. genuiDe soienoe is 
ossible.37 
Now since Brownson maintains that the problem proposed by" Kant is 
ubstantiall7 the s~ as that raised by Descartes.38 we summarize briefly. 
as Brownson does. the status of the problem. ot knowledge at the time of Kant. 
Descartes. as we pointed out. established• rather than solved the problem of 
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knowledge. Malebranche. Hobbes. Berkley and Hume wrestled with the same 
problem. but could not offer a satisfactory solution. The question of the 
origin, ground, and validity of knowledge was, then, an open question ever 
since Descartes raised and failed to solve it. We find that Kant. well aware 
of the unsuccessful attempts of his predecessors; now presents his answer to 
the problem. 
From what has been said already it is quite obvious that, according to 
Brownson, Kant really attempts to establish the possibility of human knowl-
edge as well as its limitations.39 Brownson, however, admits that Kant does 
not propose the problem precisely in this form; but in so doing he disguises 
the real problem both from himself and his readers. According to Brownson. 
Kant tells us that any advance in knowledge is impossible without synthetic 
judgments ~priori. And then Kant directs his attention to these judgments. 
Are they valid at all? To what extent are they valid? How are they formed? 
So it seems evident to Brownson that in Kant's system the validity of 
knowledge is dependent upon the validity of the synthetic judgment ~priori. 
And so Brownson concludes that Kant. in investigating the ground and possibil· 
ity of synthetic judgment ~priori~Oinvestigates the very possibility of 
knowledge itself - moreover. that is the real problem of Kant. 
Thus far we have presented as accurately as possible Brownson's notion 
of the problem which Kant has undertaken to solve. And of course Brownson's 
criticism will be rendered on the basis of whether or not Kant has solved 
that problem. And that is why Brownson remarks at the vary beginning that 
Kant began in a capital blunder. For Brownson states very emphatically that 
any question as to the possibility of human knowledge is a stupid and 
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ridiculous question.42 In Brownson's estimation then, it is the supremest 
arrogance, to ask whether or not the mind can know. For as he points out, 
"we have only the human mind with which to answer the question." And since 
he claims that Kant is trying to establish the possibility and validity of 
knowledge, he remarks that it requires knowledge to answer the question 
concerning the possibility of knowledge, even as knowledge is required to 
answer ~ other question. Hence the absurdity of trying to establish the 
validity of the mind by the mind, the possibility of knowledge by knowledge. 
But even granting for the sake of argument that we could, by a most 
rigorously logical demonstration, prove that science is impossible, such a 
demonstration would establish the tact of science in concluding to the 
~ontrarz. For the demonstration must itself be scientific or unscientific. 
If it is not a scientific demonstration it is worthless and proves nothing 
nothing either way concerning our ability to know. If the demonstration is 
itself scientific it most certainly cannot conclude to the impossibility of 
the mind to know, for that would involve a contradiction.43 
Further.more Kant, according to Brownson, makes a pretense of beginning 
at a point ~dway between dogmatism and sceptici~, for he professedly begins 
as a critic. In other words Kant's purpose is to criticize or investigate 
~he foundation of knowledge to see whether or not it is secure.44 Hence 
~ant at the outset "neither affirms nor denies; he merely criticiset,that is, 
investigates." It is only after his investigation that he will conclude to 
the possibility or impossibility of knowing reality, to the validity or invali~­
ity of the foundation of knowledge. In other words, according to Kant, before 
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we trust reason we must first establish its trustworthiness; we must criticise 
and investigate to see what reason can or cannot do before admitting its 
reliability.45 
But Brownson. while noting clearly that Kant attempts to begin as a 
critical philosopher. d.enies that Kant has the slightest justification for 
so beginning. Not only has he no justification for beginning as a critic• 
but it is impossible. nay. absurd for him to do so.46 Thus in Brownson's 
estimation Kant began in pure dogmatism. Moreover. according to Brownson. 
Kant professes to have demonstrated. as the result of his labor • the imposs:D:>iJ -
ity of scientific knowledge. And hence from this data Brownson concludes: 
"He (Kant) begins by assuming the possibility of soienoe. as the condition of 
demonstrating its impossibility.47 
Now the above argument is based on what we might call purely a priori 
grounds. For before attempting a detailed investigation of Kant's system 
Brownson attempts to prove that the vary starting point of Kant must lead 
him to error. The argument which follows is on muoh the same sort of a P!iori 
basis. For he maintains that Kant's unqualified condemnation of all previous 
metaphysics is. to say the least. a strong presumptive proof that Kant himself 
is to be condemned. For Brownson maintains that the science of today must 
be built upon the foundations of the past; and hence. in order to advance 
science, one must accept, not demolish. the contributions of the past. And 
so, as far as Brarm.son is concerned, Kant is without merit himself if he can 
find no merit in his predecessors.48 
From the criticism of Kant advanced thus far by Brarm.son we may observe 
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that he is interested primarily in refuting the entire Kantian system of 
philosophy. He is convinced at the very outset that Kant's system is 
pernicious, because Kant. in constructing his system, will not be guided by 
Divine Revelation. Furthermore. as Schlesinger noted, Brownson felt that he 
could not, without doing violence to his convictions, accept both the doc-
trines of Kant and the Church. And so he ridicules the very starting point 
of Kant as the most effective way of proving his system to be worthless. And 
as a sort of popular argument he also points to the "arrogance of Kant" in 
refusing to recognize anything worthwhile in the systems of previous metaphys· 
icians. 
To summarize briefly Brownson's criticism of Kant's point of departurea 
Brownson maintains that Kant attempts to criticise thought antecedently to the 
acceptance of its validityJ and hence in Brownson's interpretation, Kant reall 
attempts to establish the veracity of man's faculties. But this, according 
to Brownson. is absurd. for we must, at the outset assume the ability of the 
mind to attain to truth. For he recognizes dogmatism as the only valid start· 
ing point in philosophy. Any other point of departure. according to him. is 
inconsistent. However. it is quite possible that Brownson. in criticising 
Kant as he did. misrepresented him and missea entirely the real point at issue 
in the very notion of a critical philosophy.49 
The reason Why Brownson, at this time, criticises Kant as he does may be 
explained by the fact that he was so anxious to refute Kant; and his desire tCl 
overthrow the Kantian system might be responsible for the fact that he failed 
to concede what was properly due to Kant. Moreover, since there is no 
recognition of critical starting point in Brownson's classification of systems 
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he cannot recognise the possibility of such a starting point. And thus an 
explanation of his eritici£m of Kant might lie in the tact that Brownson 
began his criticism with the assUDlption that all systems of philosophy might 
be classified on the basis of certain similarities • 
.And since he began his criticism with a classification of systems, and 
since he maintains that Kant is unable to render an explanation of science. 
Brownson classifies Kant in his Doctrine of Science as a Sensist. And 
perhaps it is because he was so intensley interested in discovering the 
similarities in systems of philosophy that he failed to grasp the difference 
in the starting points of Kant and Descartes. 
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FOOTNOTES OF CHAPTER I 
21Bro~son has a rather lengthy and involved explanation and refutation of 
cousin's method of olassitication. Works. I. PP• 130-144. But since a 
detailed discussion of his views is unnecessary for an understanding of 
his Critici~ of Kant. we present only his ultimate conclusions. 
22works, I, P• 142. 
25works. I, P• 138. 
24"The Unitarian. no doubt, believes that God is the living God; but he enters 
into no inquiry as to what. touching the ineffable mystery of the Divine 
Being. is implied in this assertion. that God is the living God. He. 
therefore. stops Short of a real doctrine of Life." Works, I, P• 138. 
25for a more complete treatment of the above. cr. Works, I, PP• 138-143. 
26ttwas the question between the Arians and the Athanasians nothing but a 
question of mere dogma enjoined by authority? Was it for a single 
diphthong that men disputed and cut one another• s throats for some three 
hundred yearsf Do not so libel humanity. • •• In asserting that the son 
was made of like substance w1 th the Father, what did the HomDiousian 
attempt. but""'t't"'introduce two kindred substances as the basis of his 
theory of the universe, and thus to explain Life from the point of view of 
plurality, which is Polytheism or .A.theismt" Works, I, P• 143. 
27works, I. P• 146. · 
28Maritain expresses a somewhat similar view: "I shall consider Luther. not 
to study htm exhaustively and as the founder of Protestantism, but to bring 
out certain features in the character of that enemy of philosophy which are 
of consequence to our philosophical battles. After all, it would be 
astonishing if the extraordinary loss of balance induced in the Christian 
mind by heresy had not had the most important repercussions in all spheres, 
particularly in that of the speculative and practical reason. By the very 
fact that the Lutheran revolution bore on religion, on that which governs 
all human activity, it was the attitude of the human soul and of speculativ 
thought confronted with reality." Three Reformers, New York, 1936, P• 4. 
Cf. also PP• 45-50. 
29schlesinger says much the same thing when he points out that Kant was the 
one main intellectual obstacle between BroTmson and the Catholic church; 
Brownson. according to Schlesinger, "spent much of 1844 surmounting •••• 
"The discouraging doctrines of Kant, who had argued away the possibility of 
reaching absolute truth, still stood between Brownson and his sanctuary. 
Kant, indeed, grew to be the great topic of conversation in the Brownson 
home. Even the children talked of the categories of judgment and the 
D~-an-sich. A Pilgrim's Progress. PP• 177-6. 
30Works, I, P• 15~. 
31Is was explained above, this analysis of thought was derived from Cousin; 
see above, influence of Cousin on Brownson. 
32works, I, P• 154. 
3~orks, I, P• 155. 
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34Brownson also denys that the Inductive method has "wrought suoh mighty 
wonders even in the physical science." It has not given us the "exact 
sciences": the so-called exact sciences are not worthy of the name "Science 
"We must beg them to pardon us. if we find it impossible to stretch our 
courtesy so far as to call this knowledge and classification of phenomena, 
science." Works, I, PP• 157•8. 
S6"Hobbes is a true Englishman: and therefore, must needs profess one doctrin 
and practice another. If he loves mankind, he must in doctrine• atone for 
his philanthropy, by maintaining the duty to hate them; if he hates them, 
he must be eloquent in praise of universal benevolence. Confide with your 
'Whole heart in an Englishman or an American, unless he preaches philanthropy 
When he once mounts that for his hobby, look well to your looks and keys." 
Works, I• P• 159. 
S6We have little sympathy with David Hume, a much overestimated writer, who 
was an unbeliever in religion, a sceptic in philosophy, and of no remark• 
able worth or moral dignity as a man,; but he is one of the great names of 
British metaphysical speculation, and no student of the aberrations of the 
human mind for the last century and over, whether in Great Britia.n or on 
the Continent can safely overlook his essays. Works, I, P• 381. 
37"He succeeded in showing that the emperical philosophy favored by Bacon 
and Hobbes and elaborated and defended by Locke, conducts every one of its 
disciples of a little logical nerve to mere egoism and scepticism." Works, 
I, P• 381. 
S8"Kant•s problem, we see, then, was precisely the problem with which 
Descartes commenced, and which he trenched, rather than solved, by his 
famous enthym.eme • • • • His originality is not in his problem but in his 
mode of handling it." Works, I, P• 161. 
~The science, that is, the knowing, properly so called, is all and entirely 
in this very synthetic judgmen~ I£ this judgment be impossible, it be 
invalid, then is science impossible, and human knowledge a mere delusion. 
So, after all, Kant is inquiring into the possibility, as well as into the 
conditions, validity, extent and bounds of science." Works, I, P• 162. 
Kant, however, never completes this line of reasoning. And therefore the 
hypothetical proportion proposed by Brownson would, for Kant, be a false 
question. Andsince the hypothetical proposition is questionable, therefore 
the conclusion is also of doubtful validity. However, whether or not 
Brownson misrepresented Kant at this point remains an open question. 
40Although Brownson does not cite texts from Kant to substantiate his 
interpretation, he might very well have had the following in minda "We 
must discover on the largest scale the ground of the possibility of 
synthetical judgments a Prioria we must understand the conditions which 
render every class of them possible"• Kant•s Critque of Pure Reason. F. 
Max MUller, New York, 1927; Second edition, revised, p;-8:--(Hereatter 
cited as Critique.) 
41It has been suggested that the real purpose of Kant's Critique was to give 
a via media for the explanation of knowle~e between the lnnatism of 
Lelbnitz and the sensism of Hume, as Tur~uld seem to indicate when he 
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says: ~e may describe Kant as dissatisfied with the rational philosophy 
because it exaggerated the a Priori, and with the empirical philosophy 
because it exaggerated the a osteriori, elements of knowledge"• History 
of Philosothy, P• 530. Althou Brownson does not state explicitly that 
tnis was t e real purpose of the Critifue, he states very clearly on 
several occasions that Kant•s explanat on of knowledge combines certain 
features of both inn.a.tism and empiricism. Works, I, PP• 163, 183. 209. 
42Assuming this, we may say, in the outset that the whole inquiry into which 
Kant enters is founded in a capital blunder, and can end in no solid or 
useful result. To ask if the human mind be capable of science is absurd; 
for we have only the human mind with which to answer the question." Works, 
I, P• 163. 
43cf. Works, I,pp. 162-3. 
44Compare Brownson's view with the following in Kanta "It is indeed a very 
common fate of human reason first of all to finish its speculative edifice 
as soon as possible, and then only to enquire nether the foundation be sure 
Then all sorts of excuses are made in order to assure us as to its solidity, 
or to decline altogether suoh a late and dangerous enquiry." Critique, p.41 
45cf. also Kant: "Its (metaphysic's) procedure is at first dogmatlo;~.e., 
unchecked by a previous examination of what reason oan and cannot do, before 
it engages confidently in so arduous an undertaking. • • • Now it might 
seem natural that, after we have left the solid ground of experience, we 
should not at once proceed to erect an edifice with knowledge wnich we 
possess ·without knowing whence it came, and trust to principles the origin 
of which is unknown, without having made sure of the safety of the foundati s 
by means of careful examination. It 'WOuld seem natural, I say, that phil-
osophers Should first of all have asked the question how the mere under-
standing could arrive at all this knowledge a Priori, and what extent, what 
truth, and what value it could possess." Crit1que, p.3. 
46"But is the critic blind? To criticise, to investigate, - what is this, 
but to discriminate, to distinguish, to judge? Can there be an act of 
discrimination, of judgment, without science? If you assume, then, your 
capacity to enter into a critical investigation of the power of the human 
mind to know, you necessarily begin by assuming the possibility of science, 
and therefore by what logicians term a petitio principii. Kant attempts 
the investigation, and in so doing assumes his capacity to make it; and, 
therefore, contrary to his profession, begins in pure dogmatism." Works, 
I, P• l63e 
Works, I, P• 163. 
48iiiiritan express a somewhat similar viewa "We are bound to the past in the 
intellectual order as in every other, etc." Three Reformers, P• 3. 
49That Brownson was aware of this later on might be surmised from the follow-
ing: "Kant's masterly Critic of Pure Reason is really a criticism. on 
method, not science." works, rr, --p.--232. 
CHAPTER II 
The Complexity of the Intellective Faculty 
Kant begins his Critique with the proposition that "all our knowledge 
begins with experience". But then he reasons that if experience be possible 
at all. we must admit that the mind prior to experience possesses the condi-
tions which render experience possible. The conditions necessary to render 
experience possible. Brownson notesJare, tor Kant, certain ~priori to~s or 
cognitions. And since there are ~priori cognitions or forms upon which 
experience is based, Kant's probl~ is to determine precisely what these 
cognitions are. That is, Kant wishes to investigate the ~priori conditions 
necessary for experience, as distinguished £ram, or abstracted from, the 
a posteriori elements received in the experience itself. For, by a careful 
examination of the facts of consciousness, Kant detects therein both a 
rational and empirical elementJ and he attempts to give us the precise nature 
of this rational element found in every experience. That is, after abstrac-
tion is made of all experience there remains, not the mind as a mere tabula 
but rather a mind with certain categories or ~ priori cognitions of its 
And hence we must discover the exact nature of these elements (which are 
he foundations of experience) before we can erect a scientific edifice upon 
For it is precisely because philosophers have neglected the investiga-
cognitions that they have hitherto been unprogressive. 
We may assert fir-st of all that cognitions a priori are the categories 
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of Kant. that is. "certain forms under which we necessarily apprehend all 
things".1 However. unlike the categories of Aristotle. those of Kant are 
entirely subjective. and hence they are forms of the understanding itself. 
without which experience would be impossible. And because we are called upon 
to investigate the ~ priori conditions of experience as distinguished frQm 
its empirical elements. we must discover some criterion Whereby we may 
distinguish the one from the other. Hence Brownson tells us that. for Kant. 
the distinctive marks of the ! priori elements o£ knowledge are necessity and 
strict universality; tor experience can never give us the general or universa 
For example. prior to the apprehension of a particular fact of causality we 
ust be in possession of the !£riori notion o£ cause. the distinctive marks 
ot Which are necessity and strict universality. Thus whatever is necessary 
or universal in our knowledge is supplied by the understanding itsel£.2 Now 
the possibility of applying these ~Rriori cognitions to the particular and 
contingent facts o£ experience is What Brownson understands by the transcenden 
tal cognitions of Kant. 3 And since. as we have observed. the categories of 
Kant are entirely subjective. they cannot be object nor derivable from ~ 
object. Therefore Kant's whole investigation must be limited to the sphere 
of the subject. But Kant investigates the subject not as actually thinking 
or knowing. but rather the inherent forms within the subject that render 
owledge possible. That is. Kant investigates the categories or innate forms 
of the subject. and without these forma or categories the subject itself is 
incapable of experience. And hence the power to experience is due • from the 
standpoint of the subject. to the tact that the subject is in possession of 
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cognitions ~priori or categories. 
Now these categories. according to Brownson. are not produced or formed 
by the mdnd. Nor are they the actual operation ot the mind. that is. the 
actual thinking or knowing ot particular facts. Rather these cognitions are 
innate or inherent forms ot the understanding itself. That is. they lie 
ready in the understanding and are supplied by it on the occasion of a partie-
ular fact ot experience. And because these cognitions are not produced b.1 
the mind nor are they the mind in operation or ,!!'!. ~· Brownson maintains 
that they can be nothing more than the possibility of the mind• or the power 
of the mind. in a fact ot experience. to add something to the experience 
ch cannot be found therein. In other words, on the occasion of a tact of 
experience, the mind :furnishes an~ prior!, element out ot its own resources 
and applys that element to the experience. For Brownson. then. Kant is 
criticising the subject considered as a power or potency; that is. the mere 
ability of the subject to think., or the faculty of reason "in potentia. non 
- -
in aotu" • In other words • according to Brownson Kant is investigating the 
-
faculty ot reason or the cognitive force itself (in his language, the inneity 
of the subject), as distinct from the actual oognition.4 
Here, again. Brownson claims to have penetrated the verbiage ot the 
Critique. and seized the real meaning of Kant's cognitions ~priori. For he 
professes to have examined carefully the possible meanings of cognitions 
a priori as Kant uses the term. and concludes that the one he has stated above 
is the correct meaning.s And so Brownson continues his criticism of Kant on 
the assumption that Kant, in investigating the cognitions ~priori or the 
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categories, is investigating the faculty of reason itself; and moreover, 
reason in the sense of the power or ability of reason, that is, reason "in 
R.otentia, ~.!.!~"· 
From this viaw of cognitions ~friori, several important conclusions 
follow, and they follow inevitably, even though Brownson admits that Kant 
himself does not draw them from the premises given. For if the power of the 
understanding to know is due to the presence of certain categories, and with-
out these categories the understanding would not be what it is. Brownson con-
cludes that these cognitions must be the constituent elements of the understan -
ing itself. And in order to make these cognitions ~ priori the constituent 
elements of the understanding, Kant must assume the complexity of the cognitiV1 
~orce. He must assume, then, ~t it can be analysed, broken up into its 
~omponent parts.6 And therefore Brownson concludes that Kant really arrives 
~this cognitions! priori by decomposing the faculty of reason itself.7 
That is, Kant, by an analysis of reason. arrives at its constituent elements. 
namely the cognitions .! priori, without which reason could not function. And 
Brownson maintains that it is precisely with the assumption of the complexity 
of the human understanding that Kant's real error begins. Now it Kant is 
~ong in assuming the complexity of the cognitive force, Brownson lllUSt estab-
~ish its simplicity. And in order to see how he does this we must have S0118 
!notion of what he understands by the soul and the faculties of the soul. 
Brownson, by way or criticism remarks- that there is really an ambiguity 
~n Kant• s use of the term understanding. For he says that "the understanding, 




take it".s In other words Brownson maintains that Kant views reason as made 
up of constituent elements (pure and transcendental cognitions), and yet 
he also looks upon these elements as the instruments of reason; that is, the 
pure and transcendental cognitions are distinct from reason, but they are, 
nevertheless, means at the disposal of reason. Therefore they would be 
neither the understanding itself nor yet the completed act of the understand-
ing, (that is, neither the substantive force which knows nor the actual 
cognition or "the knowing taken phenomenally"), but rather something midway 
between these alternatives. In the words of Brownson "they are neither the 
vis nor the actus, but the endowments, attributes, or properties of the force 
-
cognizing. This is Kant•s actual doctrine as exactly seized and stated as it 
is possible for us to seize and state it".9 
Now Brownson condemJ.s this view as the real source of the errors of modern 
hilosophy, for it assumes that the powers of the soul called faculties are 
distinguishable from. the subject in 'Which they inhere. That is, some phil-
osophers fancy a distinction between the intellect, for example, and the force 
thin man that acts, namely, the soul; or in Brownson's language, some 
hilosophers assume a distinction between the subject and the inneity of the 
subject, between the me and the inneity of the me. But according to Brownson 
- -
there is no basis for such an assumption, for he maintains that faculties or 
owers of the soul are indistinguishable from the subject in which they inhere 
e admits a distinction of faculties whithin the subject, but not from the 
-
subject.lO For he maintains that "the .faculty really is the subject, that 
-
is, the subject under a given aspect".ll 
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Now Brownson holds this view precisely because it safeguards both the unity 
of man and the simplicity of his active principle. For he points out that 
in every action of man, the whole man, as a unity, acts. The eye, for 
example, does not see, but man sees; reason does not know, but man knows. 
Moreover, Brownson maintains that I do not know because I have reason, but 
because I ~reason; I do not feel because I have sensibility, but because 
I am it. And since man is a unity, and since the whole man knows, feels., 
and acts, he concludes that "I must needs act, feel, and know in all and 
every one of rrr:f phenomena" • That is, the mind is a single vis or force, and 
-
never acts with one faculty one faculty alone; for each action of man is the 
act of the single whole, and the whole man must enter into each act of man. 
Therefore when he feels, for example, he never acts with his sensibility 
alone, leaving his reason behind, as it were. The whole essential man, with 
all his attributes and in the unity of his nature, is entirely present in 
each act of that man. But, though all of man's acts flow from one nature., 
still he may act in diverse ways; but this is due, not to faculties distinct 
from the principle of these aota, but in virt~ of a distinction of faculties 
in the very bosom of the soul itself'. In other 110rds he maintains simply 
that the faculties are not distinct from the soul, but that they are virtually 
disti.not within the sou1.12 
Now, according to Brownson, an erroneous view of substance is responsible 
for the above mentioned error in regard to the distinction of faculties. For 
Brownson maintains that Kant• s notion of substance is that of a substratum. 
iCh underlies and upholds, qualities, properties, or faculties". That is, 
r----------, 
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substance tor Kant is a kind o£ hidden core to Which propertiss or attributes 
are attached. Thus. in Kant• s view or substance. then, Brownson maintains tha: 
it would be possible to abstract from an object all the qualities and attribut s 
revealed to us by experience and still arive at something hidden beneath these 
properties. which is their support. Brownson maintains that this is absurd.l3 
For beginning with this Kantia:n notion or substance as a substratum.l4 diver• 
sity or substances would be inadmissible. Beings could differ accidentally. 
but not substantially.15 Moreover. he maintains that this same erroneous 
notion or substance as substratum is responsible tor the stupid view o£ some 
moderns Who maintain that ma:n is different from the brute only because o£ the 
addition of a certain distinctive human quality superinduced upon a substance 
common to him and the animal world.l6 
Condemning this notion ot substance as erroneous. Brownson defends what 
he conceives as good in the view of Leibnitz. namely. that sUbstance is active 
or acting force (vis activa. or what the Germa:ns call Kraft). That is• activ-
ity is the fundamental note in the conception of substance. rather than that o 
permanence. For he maintains that a being !!• only insofar as it is active. 
Hence the substance or the thing is and must be the active principle within 
the thing. From this it follows. then. that every being must be substantially 
a monad or a unity.17 For it substance be identified with the active force ot 
a being. then. to suppose two active forces within a being would be to suppose 
two substantial beings. not one. Applying this notion ot substance to man 
Will• perhaps, give us a clearer notion of Brownson's arguments against the 
real distinction of faculties tram the soul. We find, then. that since the 
r----------~ 
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substance of a thing is identified with the active force of a being, man must 
be substantially a simple, acting force; that is, man is in his essence a 
unity or a monad. And thus it is that the faculties of man cannot be distinct 
tram the simple principle of activity within him; for if the faculties were 
active principles really distinct from the soul there would be more than one 
active force in man. And on that basis man would not be a unity, but must 
be a substantial plurality. 
But Brownson has yet another argument against the real distinction of 
faculties. For he argues that the force that knows, for example, is called 
the understandingJ and that understanding must be identical with the soul. 
For if the understanding were really distinct from the soul, there must, 
according to Brownson, be some sort of division or separation between the 
soul and the understandingJ18 that is, the understanding would enjoy, at 
least inaamuch as it is distinct tram the soul, some sort of existence 
independently of the soul. And hence if there is a real distinction between 
the soul and the understanding, the soul considered in itself (that is, apart 
from the understanding which is distinct from it), would be essentially 
incapable of intelligence. And since the soul is the principle of activity 
in man, and since that active principle is the substance of man, Brownson 
concludes that man himself, (that is, on the basis of a real distinction of 
faculties from the soul), would be substantially unintelligent. That is, 
understanding would belong, not to the substantial, active principle called 
the me.l9 But this conclusion is absurd. for consciousness testifies to 
the fact that the acts of the understanding are essentially my own acts, not 
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the acts of a somewhat substantially distinct from myself.20 
However, since the soul is capable of diverse acts, namely volitions, 
sentiments and cognitions. these acts must be due, not to any complexity in 
the soul, but to the fact that the soul is a limited being; that is, the soul 
is potential as well as actual, and it overcomes its limitations in different 
ways; and it does this, not t~ simul, but successively. Moreover, the 
faculties of man are nothing more than the powers or potencies of man, while 
the soul considered as an entity is essentially an active force. And there-
fore Brownson concludes that the distinction between the soul and its facul-
ties (if they can be said to be distinct at all)e is merely the distinction 
"between actual being and potential being, between the vis activa and the 
potentia ~ of the Schoolmenn.21 
Furthermore, since E?tentia designates a lack of being rather than a 
~erfection, faculties are not something positive and superinduced upon the 
soul, and hence they cannot be really distinct from it. However, it oannot 
be said that the soul and its faculty are actually the same; for the soul, 
considered as an entity, is essentially active while the faculty is a power 
pr a potency. But in Brownson's view the faculty is "virtually the soul, 
and becomes the soul inasmuch as it is actualized or perfected"• And there-
fore, again, the soul and its faculty are virtually, not really distinct.21 
This rather lengthy treatment of the identity of the soul and its faculties 
seems almost superflous in an essay criticising the Critique~~ Reason. 
~or the distinction of faculties is not really a problem that Kant himself 
~roposes in the Critique. Brownson's treatment of this problem, however, is 
r-· -----~ 
40 
iroportant for us, not only by reason of the fact that, strictly speaking, he 
imposes this problem on Kant; but also because he makes it the foundation 
upon which he constructs his whole refutation of Kant. And therefore, as we 
shall note later, understanding of his doctrine of substance in conjunction 
with his treatment of the real distinction of faculties, is a necessary 
prerequisite for an understanmwg of his refutation of Kant. 
Moreover, it is from Brownson's notion of substance that we derive his 
conception of the essential nature of man. For when he speaks of the~" 
he designates the active principle within man whioh, in turn is identified wit 
the essence of man. Hence man himself is not body, but rather, "spirit 
living in body and served by bodily organs". Henoe, properly speaking, the 
agent of every act of man is the physical man; and hence Whatever he does, 
whether it be willing, feeling, or knowing, is done by the same simple, 
spiritual force called the !!•23 
Now the whole point of Brownson's discussion of substance in relation 
to the distinction of faculties in man is to show that there is a clear cut 
distinction between subject and object. That is, whatever is inherent in the 
subject really!! the subject and is indistinguishable from it. Or, in the 
rds Brownson repeats so frequently throughout his criticism: 
If Kant had comprehended, in the outset, the simple 
fact subsequently stated by Fiothe in the postulate, 
the me is me, he never would, he never could, have 
written the-Critic of Pure Reason: for he would have 
seen that if the me is "'"iii8;' the not-me is not-me, and 
therefore that the-object, or whatever is objective, 
since distinguished from the subject, is not and 
cannot b• me, nor the innei ty of the me. This simple 
truism, ~niCh is nothing but saying, ldlat is, is, 
completely refutes the whole critical philosop '• 
r 
We would therefore commend to the admiers of the 
Critik der reinen Vernunst of the master, the careful 
study or-the Wissen-schaftslehre of the disciple.24 
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And hence as Brownson himself observes, the principle that whatever is dis-
tinct from the subject or the ~ is not and cannot be inherent in the subject 
and hence must be object and really separate from the subject. is the 
principle of his whole refutation of Kant. 
We have seen thus far that Kant's errors may be traced ultimately to 
his false conception of substance. For according to Brownson he viewed 
substance as a kind of substratum or hidden core, really distinct from the 
properties, qualities, and attributes which it upholds. And hence viewing 
the soul, as a substance and the faculties as properties of the soul. it 
follows that the faculties may be really distinct from the soul. And hence 
a pernicious vi~w of substance gave rise to what Brownson considers to be an 
equally pernicious view. namely that the faculties or powers of the soul may 
be really distinct from it. 
And hence it is impossible for Kant to view his ~priori forms as really 
distinct from the understanding, but nevertheless as means inherent in and at 
the disposal of the understanding. For. by correcting ihe false notion of 
substance stated above and substituting in its place the correct conception 
of it (that the fundamental note in the conception of sUbstance is Kraft. or 
simple active force). he has ·established that it is impossible for the 
cognitions to be necessary forms inherent in the understanding and yet 
distinct from it. For the understanding is identified with the soul, the 
!!! activa, the psychical man. the ~· Which enters wholly and entirely into 
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each action of man. And since a real distinction means, for Brownson, sep-
arability, the means by which I know cannot be distinct from the ~· for if 
they were distinct from me, the soul itself would be essentially unintelligeni; 
and hence knowledge could not be attributed to the ~· but to a somewhat 
really distinct from~. 
And thus it is that Brownson maintained at the beginning of this chapter 
that the cognitions ~priori, or the categories of Kant, are really the under· 
standing itself and indistinguishable from it. And hence the theory of 
categories or subjective forms inherent in the understanding is inadmissable 
because such categories assume that the understanding is complex. And ~ 
the understanding cannot be complex because it is identified w1 th the simple 
vis or active force within man which is the soul. 
Now since the categories of Kant are unjustifiable, and moreover, 
demonstrably false because they introduce complexity into the soul, it is, 
therefore, legitimate to conclude even at this point that it is impossible fo 
Kant to justify his synthetic judgments ~ priori. 
We must observe also, at this point, that Brownson really imposes upon 
Kant both his theory of substance and the conclusions following from it, 
namely that the faculty that knows is complex. For we scarcely need to 
point out that neither of these "problems" really were problems for Kant. 
For if "we have always to deal with representations only" and if "how things 
may be by themselves, apart from my representations" is completely beyond 
the sphere of knowledge, why would Kant be disturbed about the substance of 
things? And hence, by imposing his own notion of substance and the consequencEs 
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flowing from it upon Kant. Brownson proposes a false problem to Kant; in 




FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II 
lworks, II, P• 48. 
2WHe (Kant) begins by analyzing the fact of experience. This fact he makes 
consist of two parts,- the one empirical and ~posteriori, the other~ 
priori, and supplied from the understanding itself. He then eliminates 
tfie empirical portion, and proceeds to his analysis of the ~ priori, portion 
which he terms cognition ~prr:;i· This cognition~ priori is assumed to 
lie already in the understand prior to any fact of actual cognition, as 
the ground and condition of the possibility of actual cognition. or. what is 
the same thing. experience" Works, I, p. 189. 
3nir we consider this cognition a priori in its application to some particula 
fact of experience. it is simply cognition~ priori; but if generally, as 
abstracted from all particular facts of experience, and as the simple 
possibility of the application of the cognition ~priori to the empirical 
fact. it is Transcendental Cognition. because it can be brought into none 
of the predicaments or categories. but transcends them all" Works. I, p.l89 
4nwe must bear in mind that our inquiry lies wholly within the region of the 
subjective faculty of intelligence. It does not concern the knowing. but 
the rowe: or ability to knOWJ not experience. but the possibility and 
oond tions of experience • • • • they are not the thinking of that which 
transcends experience, but the ability to think it. ThiS; in simple terms. 
is all that we can rmderstand by the pure and transcendental cognitions"• 
Works, I, P• 175. 
5ifHere we can only remark. that. while we admit ~at Kant calls cognitions 
apriori, we deny it to be a cognition a priori". Brownson then mentions 
same of the difficulties involved in a-misunderstanding of the term. and 
concludes a "But we must not dismiss such a man as Kant in this summary 
way. We ask. therefore. again. What does he really understand by cognition 
a priori?" cr. Works. PP• 173-4. 
6Brownson may have had the following text of Kant in mind in order to justify 
his conclusiona "By analytic of concepts I do not understand their analysis 
or the ordinary process in philosophical disquisitions of dissecting any giv 
concepts according to their contents. and thus rendering them more distinct; 
but a hitherto seldom atte ted dissection of the facul of the understand-
tse • w1 e so e o Jeo o 1scover~g e poss 1ty of concepts 
---..... ...,........, a prior1, by looking for them nowhere but in the understanding itself as 
their birthplace. and analysing the pure use of the understanding" Critique 
P• 154. (underscoring added). 
7Brownson himself does not pretend that his conclusion could be found in the 
Critique itself, but thatJds conclusion is justified from premises supplied 
by Kant; Cf. Works, I, P• 176. 
&Works, I. P• l76. 
~orks, I, P• 176. 10He really contends for a virtual distinction of faculties, as we shall poin 
out later. 




12 11At most, then, only a virtual distinction in the soul, of the three 
faculties of willing, feeling, and knowing, can be admitted" Works, I, 
P• 192. 
~~~bstract from a given object, corporeal or incorporeal, or, to make the 
statement as strong as possible in Kant's favor, abstract from your 
conception of object in general, all conception of qualities and properties 
and there will remain the conception of - nothing" Works, I, P• 177. 
14"It is impossible of course to determine what text of Kant Brownson had in 
mind but it may have been the following: "This sounds very well, but if' 
people are asked to explain what they mean by substance, they find it by 
no means easy to answer without reasoning in a circle. How can we conclude 
immediately tram the action to the permanence of the agent, which neverthe-
less is an essential and peculiar chAracteristic of substance (phaenomenon) 
• • • As all effect consists in that which happens, that is, in the change-
able, indicating time in succession, the last subject of it is the perman-
ent, as the substratum of all that changes, that is substance" Critique 
p:-167. Ct. Also, PP• 150-4, especially page 154. 
15"As substantive, all beings would be one and identical; and multiple and 
diverse only in relation to their accidents • • • • It was this same 
erroneous notion of substance, that misled Spinoza and involved him in his 
_pantheistic f'ataliam" Works, I, P• 179. 
16i1Thus, it has been contended that there is an ascending scale tram the 
lowest animal up to man and the ascent consists in adding, in the case of 
each degree, a qualit,y to those possessed by the degree just below. The 
superior retains all that belongs to the interior, and adds a new qualit,r. 
Thus, man is the resume of the whole animal world, combining in himself 
all the qualities of all the various orders of existence below him, and 
adding to them certain qualities which none of them have. Thus man may be 
defined, for instance, a monkey -- with additions&" Works, I, P• 179. 
17Although Brownson uses some of his ~inology, he does not accept the 
whole system of Leibnitz. He even makes certain reservations on Leibnitz 1 
view of substance. 
18Brownson•s argument seems to be based upon the assumption that a real 
distinction necessarily implys separability. 
19"In cognition there must needs be an agent that cognizes. Now, this agent 
the understanding, taken ontologically, as force, not as the product or the 
instrument of force. The understanding, then, is force knowing, or 
intelligencing. This force must be identically and integrally me; or it 
must be distinct tram me. If distinct from me, it is a separate, and so 
far as I mn concerned an independent being, and is not me, but another me, 
and, therefore, in no sense a predicate of me. But here-is still another 
difficulty. The moment you affirm the faculty of intelligence to be a 
cognitire foroe, and distinct from me, you declare intelligence cannot be 
a predicate of me. I ~. then, in myself, incapable of intelligence. Now, 
how am I, essentially, that is to say, in my essence (esse), unintelligent, 
incapable of intelligence. ever to know? The knower would not be me, but a 
faculty of intelligence proved to be not mel Works, I, P• 182. --
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Evidently Brownson here fails to consider another possible alternative. 
namely that the intellect m8J be distinct from the soul as a substantial 
principle, and yet not be ontologically distinct (to use Brownson's 
phrase). However, it may be that Brownson considered this alternative and 
disagreed with it because he would not admit the distinction of the 
substance from its mode, to be a real distinction. 
20"How am I, essentially unintelligent, to be placed in such a relation with 
intelligence as to believe, and to have the right to affirm• that its acts, 
which are cognitions, ere not its, but mine?" Works, I, P• 182. 
2lworks, I, P• 191. 
22nThen again, if we shift our point of view, and consider the faculty. not 
as the negation of being merely, but as the positive ability of the soul 
to remove its limitations by realizing its essence, as the virtuality of 
the soul, then it becomes virtually the soul itself. and therefore. 
virtually indistinguishable from it, as we contended in our former article. 
The soul and its faculty are the soul in its actualit,y and its virtuality. 
in its aotual essence and its virtual essence. The faculty is not actually 
the soul, because it is not actual being; it is virtually the soul, and 
becomes it really and identically just so far as it becomes real. 
Essentially, then, the faculty and the soul are one and the same." Works. 
I, P• 191. 
23"How the soul can use the body and be itself affected by whatever affects 
the body is also a mystery, an impenetrable mrstery. All we know is, that 
it does use the body. and is affected by all its accidents. What we oall 
affections of the body are in reality affections of the soul, at least in 
great part. In pain, it is not my body that suffers the pain, but I myself 
So in disease, and the innumerable ills that flesh is heir to. The agent 
and patient are the psychical man, not the physical man. In sensibility. 
I use What are called the senses are not senses, but the organs of sense. 
That which senses is the spiritual force Which I call I, mwself". Works, 
I, P• 193. 




As we mentioned before. Brownson maintains that Kant•s fundamental 
error lies in the fact that he considers the subjective faculty of intelligen e 
to be complex. and hence susceptible of analysis. And in accordance With 
that conviction. Brownson holds that Kant resolves the faculty of intel-
ligence into its component elements. ~ely: 
1. Sensibility. or the Receptivity 
2. Understanding. or the power of 
conceiving 
3. Reason. or the faculty of Ideasl 
Now in explanation of the above we note first of all that it is by the 
sensibility that objects are presented to us. or. as Kant says. "sensibility 
alone supplies us with intuitions (Anschaugen)"2 The term understanding 
designates the power by which the intuitions become thought. and it is from 
thought that conceptions arise. After conceptions came the Ideas which are 
furnished by Reason: according to Brownson ideas seem to be related to 
conceptions. as conceptions are related to intuitions.3 
Now in accordance with this three-fold division of the force that knows. 
Kant classifies all mental phenomena into intuitions. conceptions and ideas. 
And since he has a separate treatise on each one of these sub-divisions. 
Kant's Critique is divided into: I. Transcendental Aesthetics. in which 
he treats of intuitions; II. Transcendental Logic. ot Elementary Science. 




III. Transcendental Dialectics. in which he discusses the Ideas. and makes 
the especial Critic of Pure Reason. as distinguished from Sensibility and 
Understanding.4 
Quite obviously Brownson does not accept the above for he considers it 
to be an analysis of the intellectual faculty; and. as we noted before.s 
he has a rather lengthy and involved argument to prove that the knowing force 
is s~ple and therefore incapable of analysis. And since a real distinction 
of the faculties is inadmissible. there is. ~fortiori. no basis for further 
distinctions within one of the powers of the soul. namely the power of 
kno~. 
For Brownson. then. the Transcendental Aesthetics deals merely with one 
of the sub-divisions of the faculty of knowing. namely the sensibility from 
which intuitions are derived. That is. when an object effects the faculty 
of representation, it is called a sensation. And the intuitions of that 
object by means of that sensation is empi~cal. In other words, the process 
by which an object is represented to or placed before the mind is called 
intuition. Now that intuition. as Kant points out, may be either strictly 
empirical or pure.6 That is to say, by an analysis of the intellectual 
phenomena, Kant discovers therein both cognitions ~priori and cognitions 
~posteriori. These cognitions ~priori are the forms of the subject, and 
lie ready for the subject to use on the occasion of a particular fact of 
experience; furthermore, they can be considered separately from the sensation 
itself.1 Now the pure intuition considered separately from the emperioal 
sensation is the only thing that the sensibility itself can supply. Now 
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there are two pure fo~ of sensuous intuition, according to Kant, namely, 
Space and Time. Now the name cognition ~posteriori designates that portion 
of experience considered separately from the pure forms of sensuous intuition 
which are added by the mind.9 
Now the empirical intuition of any object is impossible without the 
cooperation of the pure intuition; and thus intuition of any object is 
impossible without intuition of its space. That is, empirical intuition of 
space is impossible without a pure intuition of space or the ~ priori form 
of space in general, which form lies ready in the understanding. Now accord-
ing to Brownson the possibility of applying this pure intuition of space to 
any particular intuition of an object is called the transcendental intuition. 
And from what we have stated above it is quite obvious that this pure intuit:io 
r/Dt: 
isAdependent upon experience, nor is it in any way derivable from experience; 
for the transcendental form of space is the condition that renders experience 
possible. That is, the transcendental intuition of space must be inherent in 
the sensibility itself, for it is only because of the presence of the trans-
cendental that we oan experience things as existing in space. 
The same conditions must be present in order to experience things 
successively or in time. Just as the pure form of space (under which form 
the co-existence of objects are apprehended) lies already in the mind• so 
also i& the form "time" subjective. That is, time must be given ~ priori 
in order that we might apprehend the succession of events. For the pure 
intuition of time cannot be derived from change or succession. because it is 
prior to such an experience. The transcendental intuition of time, then, is 
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a form of the sensibility itself. and is supplied by the sensibility on the 
occasion of a fact of experience.lO 
Now Brownson maintains that. even regardless of whether or not Kant can 
be refuted. he cannot establish his own doctrine. namely that the forms ot 
space and time are subjective. For it that fact could be established. it 
would. according to Brownson. impugn the reliability of the cognitive faculty 
For. according to Kant. we do not attain to a knowledge of things as they 
are in themselves (tor this is entirely beyond his sphere of investigation). 
but we know only our representations of things. That is. we know only 
representations. and representations are received only according to forma 
inherent in the mind. 
Now it is precisely this doctrine of Kant. {that we know only ropresenta 
tions) that is the point at issue; and that doctrine is. according to Brown-
son undemonstrable. For why should ~one start by assuming that we know 
only our own representations and not things in themselves? For the real 
issue to be proved is that we attain only to a knowledge of representations; 
and hence it is a petitio principii to assume at the outset what is to be 
demonstrated. namely. that our knowledge is not of things but of representati s. 
In other words. Brownson maintains that before Kant can say: "My knowledge 
extends only to the representations I have of things. let him first prove 
that he knows representations only and not things. For. that I know 
representations and not realities. is the precise point to be proved; and sino 
that point must first be demonstrated before it is acceptable. it can be 
assumed neither as a starting point. nor as a basis tor any particular 
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demonstration." And hence Kant nowhere demonstrates the doctrine upon Which 
his whole system is based. Furthermore. Brownson contends that common sense 
testifies to the fact that we know the forms of things as they actually exist 
extra~ntally. That is. the common sense of mankind tells us that we 
perceive a tree thus and so because the tree really is thus and so. Hence. 
when Kant tells us that we do not know things. but only our representations 
of things. our understanding deceives us When it tells us that we know real 
things. Our understanding is then. deceptive and if it is deceptive its 
testimony is not trustworthy. And. therefore. why trust the understanding at 
all. regardless of whether it tells us that the forms of things are subject-
ive or objective? For if consciousness is a reliable witness. its testimony 
is acceptable when it tells us that we know the forms of things; if it is 
unreliable it is not worthy of credence when it demonstrates the subjectivity 
of forms.ll And thus. if it were established that we know only representa-
tions. while the understanding testifies that we know extra~ental realities. 
the understanding is deceptive. and hence soienoe would be impossible. 
It might be objected. however. that Kant establishes his doctrine by 
proving that experience tells us only what is• but not that it must necessari-
ly be as it is and not otherwise.l2 And hence he may legitimately conclude 
that the necessary element of knowledge must be furnished by the understand-
ing. But this conclusion. according to Brownson. is illogical. In the 
first place it might be suggested that necessity and universality may be 
accounted for without having recourse to subjective forms. Moreover. the 
subject itself is contingent and individual. so why assume that it supplies 
52 
the necessary and universal element of knowledge? What reason is there for 
not assuming that the subject also supplies the contingent and the particular 
elements of the representations that we know1 And hence Brownson concedes 
that Kant has established, at best, that along 'With the intuition of the 
particular there is always the intuition of the necessary, and the general 
and universal. But to account for that necessity and universality it is not 
necessary to resort to innate forms. 
Now Brownson maintains that space and time mark the real order and 
relations of things themselves, not merely the order in which we conceive 
things.l3 But though he maintains that space and time mark real relations, 
he does not concede that they are real beings or entitie,s. Space and time, 
then, are merely relations that exist between created things in the order of 
co-existence and succession; and since they are relations only, they are 
nothing at all considered apart from the things Which are related. Hence to 
say of a thing that it exists in space is merely saying that, between objects 
co-existing, there is a certain kind of relationship. Thus, to affirm that 
things exist in time means only that there is a relationship of past and 
future between createdthings, because creatures are not pure act but must 
realize their existence progressively or successively. Therefore things do 
not exist in space and time, for space and time simply mark the relationship 
that existsbetween objects. Hence space and time begin and end with creation, 
for prior to creation only God existed. And therefore prior to creation 
space and time could not exist for there were no related objects; for there 
is no relation where there is nothing related.l4 
r 
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Now i~ the Transcendental Aesthetics again. we find Brownson condemning 
the starting point of Kant; for Brownson does not concede Kant•s right to 
subdivide the faculty of intelligence as he does. And hence, Kant again, 
for Brownson. begins his treatment of the Transcendental Aesthetics in a 
"capital blunder." And therefore on purely! priori grounds Kant's entire 
dissertation on that subject is worthless. 
Moreover, Brownson takes issue. again. with the fundamental notion of a 
critical starting point; and therefore, virtually denies Kant's right to 
begin the investigation that he does. For he maintains that universal 
scepticism is the necessary consequence of Kant's doctrine concerning the 
! priori forms of space and time. In other words, to accept Kant•s Transcen-
dental Aesthetics is, for Brownson, to commit intellectual suicide. And 
hence the only salvation of science lies in the acceptance of the doctrine 
that space and time are real extra-mental relations; and that other forms 
of knowledge are objectively rather than subjectively derived. And while 
Kant would say that "it remains completely unknown to us what objects may 
be by themselves and apart from the receptivity of our senses," Brownson 
would dispute Kant's right to make such a statement, because, if it were 
true. man's entire scientific edifice would crumble in ruins about him. 
r 
lworks, I, P• 188. 
2critique, P• 15. 
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B~nsibilit,y furnishes us with sensations, and sensations furnish us with 
intuitions (Anschaugen) and representations (Vortellungen) of objects; 
Understanding is that power by~icb an object represented or presented by 
sensibility is thought, and it furnishes us with conceptions (Begrif~en); 
Reason is the power-by which we give unity and ideal completeness to our 
conceptions, and by it we are furnished with Ideas, which are to conceptions, 
in some respects, what conceptions are to intuitions". Works, I, PP• 188-89 
4works, I, P• 189a Brownson's critici~ is limited to the Transcendental 
Aesthetics and Logic. 
~is argument is substantially the same as that given in chapter two, and 
therefore repetition here is unnecessary. 
61 call all representations in which there is nothing that belongs to sensa-
tion, pure (in a transcendental sense). The pure form therefore of all 
sbauous'-intuitions, that form in which manifold elements of phenomena are 
seen in a certain order, must be found in the mind a trior;• And this pure 
form of sensibility may be called the pure intuition Ansc auung) Critique, 
7. P• 16. 
"The matter only of all phenomena is given us a posteriori; but their form 
must be ready for them in the mind (Gemuth) a-priori, and must therefore 
be capable of being considered as separate f.rom all sensations." Critique, 
P• 16. 
8nsecondly, we shall separate from this all that belongs to sensation 
(Empfindung), so that nothing remains but pure intuition (reine .Ansohauung) 
or the mere form of the phenomena, which is the only thing which sensibilit,y 
a priori can supply." Criti~e, P• 17. 
gyn transcendental Aesthetics erefore we shall first isolate Sensibility, 
by separating everything which the understanding adds by means of its 
concepts, so that nothing remains but e.mperical intuition. (Anschauung). 
lOcf. e.lso: Time is not an empirical concept induced from any experience, 
for neither co-existence nor succession would enter into our perception, 
if the representation of time were not given a priori. Only when this 
representation a trimlli is given, can we imagine that certain things happen 
at the same time s taneously) or at different times (successively). 
Time is a necessary representation on which all intuitions depend. We can-
not take away time from phenonema in general, though we can well take away 
phenomena out of time. Time therefore is given a priori. In time alone is 
reality of phenomena possible." Critique, P• 24; 
llFurthermore, space and time are pure relations. They mark the order in 
which bodies and events stand in our intuitions, it is agreed; but who dare 
say that they mark o~ this1 Of course, if we accept Kant's doctrine, 
that the form under ich the object is perceived is derived from the 
subject, we must say so, but this is the very point in question. Kant 




no where demonstrates it. To assert a doctrine, and then to assume it, as 
the basis of particular demonstrations, while it is its~lf undemonstrated, 
is not, we believe, the general practice of good logicians, and though it 
may be authorized by the Kantian logic, is repugned by the Aristoteli~w. 
Moreover, his general doctrine is not susceptible of demonstration. It is 
in fact suicidal. If we cannot attain to cognition of things themselves, 
if we can cognize them only as objects, and as objects only under the forms 
imposed by the understanding, we can know nothing at all. We do always 
seem to ourselves to perceive the forms of the objects as objective, and 
if in this our understanding deceives us, it forfeits our confidence, can-
not be trusted at all. And no more, when by the Kantian process, it dem-
onstrates the forms to be subjective, than when, in the apprehension of 
common sense, it affirms them to be objective." Works, I, P• 198. (It 
Kant assumes his doctrine as a principle upon which he bases other proofs, 
quite obviously it cannot be demonstrated for then it would be a conclusion 
not a principle.) 
12cf. Critique, p. 1. 
13That forms of thought are objective and not subjective is established in 
the next chapter, namely, Transcendental Logic. 
"Nor can we accept, without some important qualifications, what Kant and 
even Cousin say concerning intuitions of space and time, after abstraction 
is made of their respective contents. They would have us believe that it 
is possible to conceive of space and of time, even after we have conceived 
of the absence of all contents of time. Take away in thought the entire 
universe, and we may still conceive of space as remaining; take away the 
whole order of succession, and time is left. But this we deny. For space 
and time are neither forms of the sensibility, as Kant, maintains, nor are 
they entities, as Cousin would seem to teach. They are pure relations, 
and therefore must needs be inconceivable, where there is nothing related. 
Space is very conceivable within the universe, but not out of it; for it 
marks the order in which its several parts stand to each other; but without 
the universe it is inconceivable. What is called imaginary space is 
imagina!Y, or rather a mere word, to which there is no conception to respon 
We may always ask of some particular thing, Where is it? For that merely 
asks its relation of co-existence to something else more or less clearly 
apprehended. But to ask of the universe, as embracing the totality of 
things, Where is it? is absurd; for that asks, What is the relation? where 
there is nothing related. So of time, we may ask of some particular event, 
When did it occur? for that merely asks its relation, in the order of 
succession, to some other event, to which we more or less distinctly refer. 
But to ask of the universe itself, When did it begin to exist? or. When 
will it cease to exist, is absurdJ for, besides the universe itself, there 
is nothing between which and it there is the rela. tion we express by the te 
when or by the term where. Besides the universo.there is no existence but 
God; and the relation of the universe to him is not that of time or space, 
but of the effect of its cause." Works, I, P• 199. 
CHAPTER IV 
Transcendental Logic 
Now the transcendental logic, as we have noted before, deals with 
conceptions, or apprehensions. That is, the object is given to us in intui-
tion, and the understanding thinks those objects furnished by the sensibility 
or the receptivity of our soul. Hence, both intuition and conceptions enter 
into knowledge, for without intuition objects would not be presented to us, 
and without understanding we could not think them. And therefore Kant says 
that "Thoughts without contents are empty, intui tiona without concepts are 
blind".l That is knowledge is the joint product of two distinct faculties; 
for knowledge cannot be produced either by the understanding or the sensibil-
ity alone, but by the union of both. And hence Brownson defines Kant•s 
conceptions as "the seizing, grasping, apprehending, or taking hold by the 
mind, of the object presented by intuition. But they seize the object only 
under certain fixed and definite forms".2 
Just as the intuitions, therefore, contained an empirical and a pure or 
~priori element, so also do the cognitions or thoughts. The actual cogni-
tions, then, do not and cannot give us a knowledge of reality as it exists 
independently of our mind, for we know only our concepts; and these concepts 
contain an ~priori element which has, according to Brownson, no objective 
validity (that is, there is nothing in reality to correspond to the ~priori 
cognitions). 3 For example, in knowing a tree, I do not necessarily know 
the tree as it is; rather I attain only to a knowledge of DW actual concept 
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of that tree, which concept is condition!Dby an ~priori element. Hence 
Brownson remarks that it is absurd to ask Kant whether or not the tree has 
objective existence apart from my conception, for apart from myself it is 
no object of conception; and since I know only my conceptions, I cannot, apar 
from my conceptions, affirm or deny anthing whatsoever about the tree.4 
Thus, as far as the real existence of the tree is concerned, it may or may 
not exist independently of my conception.5 However, its formal existence is 
dependent upon my intuition, for forms are supplied by the subject.s Hence 
the way in which we know a thing is due, not to 1:he object, but to 1:he sub• 
ject.7 
·Now just as we could deal separately with pure intuitions, that is, 
intuitions abstracted from any empirical admixture, so also may we deal with 
the understanding considered apart from all empirical elements. And in so 
doing we deal only with the ! priori forms of the understanding itself. 8 
And just as the sensibility could not receive intuitions save under the forms 
of where and when, so also no objects can be conceived save under the !:. priorj 
forms of the understanding. Now these forms under 1Vhich we necessarily con-






















Hence Brownson maintains that the really important problem is to ascer-
tain the principle of Kant's categories; and whether or not they are really 
derived· from the subject or the object. He points out that Aristotle 
derives his categories from extra~ntal realit.JJ and they are for him the 
necessary for-m of conception because they are the necessary for.ms of the 
thing conceived. But for Kant all this is reversed and things are conceived 
thus and so because of for-ms supplied by the und~rstanding itself, rather 
than because things are thus and so apart from the understanding. In other 
words, the understanding imposes its forms upon the object, and not~ versa. 
And thus Aristotle contended for a knowledge of things while Kant must main-
tain that things in themselves are completely unknown to us. And for that 
reason, therefore, the real point at issue in the entire Kantian system is 
"Do we alv18.ys cognize under the categories because they are the ~priori 
forms of the understanding. or because they are the forms of things themselves?nlO 
Brownson's proof that the forms of thought are objective is dependent, 
as we have noted before. upon his analysis of thought into subject, object, 
and relation. For man. because he is a creature, is a dependent being, both 
in the intellectual and physical orders; and therefore he is never sufficient 
for himself, but, in thought or any other activity he is dependent upon the 
concurrence of that which is not himself, namely the object. And because he 
is dependent in the intellectual order, he can never suffice for himself, that 
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is, be his own object. That is, according to Brownson man lives "only by 
communion with what is not himself". And just as he would starve i£ out off 
from all objects in the physical order, so also would he starve intellectuall 
if out off from all intelligible objects. In other words, thought is 
impossible if there is no subject that thinks, no object which is thought, 
and no relation between subject and object. For if the subject were removed 
there is no thought, quite obviously, because thought is impossible without 
a thinkerJ remove the object and there is equally no thought, for to think 
... 
"nothing", is simply not to think; deny the relation between subject and 
object and thought is impossible, for the soul cannot think an object unless 
it is somehow in relation with that object. Moreover, Brownson maintains 
that if the soul alone were sufficient for thought, it would be impossible 
to be certain of the objective validity of knowledge. And hence to deny the 
active concurrence of the not-me in the production of thought would be pure 
and undisguised subjectivi~; from which it would be impossible to conclude 
to any objective reality, because there would be nothing to bridge the gap 
from the subject to the object. 
Hence, on the basis of this analysis of thought, it is obviously im.pos-
sible for Kant even to investigate categories which are forms of the under-
standing. For Brownson maintains with Ficthe that the me equals me, and henc 
- -
anything which is a form of the understanding is the understanding and is 
therefore indistinguishable from it. And therefore, in order to investigate 
the categories or the innate forms of the understanding, the understanding 
would have to investigate itself, which is impossible, for in that case the 
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the subject investigatin& would be identically the subject investigated. On 
that basis we would have to conclude, according to Brownson, that "the ~ 
investigating equals the me investigated, and hence to investigate equals to 
be investigated. That is to say, it is all the same thing to strike, or to 
be struckl"ll 
But since this is patently absurd, we must conclude that the subject, 
at least inasmuch as it is investigating, is really distinct from the thing 
investigated. But, since the ~is always and everywhere equal to itself 
and indistinguishable from itself, the object, precisely because it is 
investigated, is distinct from the ~ investigating; and hence the object of 
investigation must always be the not-me.l2 
But, although Brownson denies that we can know ourselves directly, he 
contends that the me knows itself in its actions. And Kant is right, there-
fore, when he says, "I am, I think, I judge" accompanies every ~thetic judg 
ment, for the me discovers itself as an actual subject only in its conscious 
acts. But in its conscious acts the ~ can affirm itself only as the subject 
Thus I think, I am, I judge, is the subject, and the object (the somewhat 
about which I judge and think), inasmuch as it is object, is and must be 
distinct from the~~bject, or the me.l3 
From this it follows that the forms under which we cognize, because they 
are the categories and the categories are the objeot of an investigation, 
must really belong to extra~ental realities and not to the subject. For if 
they were inherent in the understanding, they would be indistinguishable 
from the understanding, and hence would not be investigated, but they would 
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be doing the investigating. And hence by the very tact that the forms under 
which we apprehend things are investigated by the understanding~ these forms 
are really distinct from it.l4 
However~ Brownson admits that the formal existence of some objects ot 
knowledge is supplied by the mind. This is the oase in the Divine attributes 
for example when we perceive the Divine Goodness as distinct from the Divine 
Justice. But these forms supplied by the mind are simply negative forms 
which we must supply because our faculties are so limited that we cannot take 
in the whole of reality at once. And because we cannot take in the whole 
ot reality at a single glance, as it were, we are compelled to regard the 
Divine wisdom and goodness as separate attributes. But because it is admitte 
that privative forms are supplied by the subject, we cannot conclude that 
positive forms are also supplied there-from. And since the categories are 
positive forms which the subject really adds to the object, the argument 
stated above is not invalidated by the admission that negative for.ms are 
subjeotive.l5 
Now Brownson admits that, granting Kant•s evaluation of the mind, his 
conclusions are irrefutable. But his error commences precisely in the lim-
itation he places on the mind, namely that the intelligible world is out of 
its reach. For Brownson maintains that his restriction of experience to 
sensible objects is unwarranted and inadmissible.16 He contends that we have 
intuitions of~ and really experience intelligible objects, that is, ideas, 
even as we have experience of sensible objects.l7 Now this statement of 
Brownson is a rather startling one if not properly understood. When Brownson 
r 
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maintains that we have real intuition of supra-sensible objects he understand 
intuition in the Kantian sense of the term, that is, that man's intellect is 
really capable of bein& placed in relation with intelligible objects; or, in 
other words, in order to know intelligible objects, these intelligible object 
must somehow be presented to the mind. And Brownson contends that we are 
placed in relation with intelligible objects only in conjunction with our 
intuition of sensible objects. He does not mean, then, that intelligible 
objects are presented to the mind directly and immediately, and without the 
medium of sensible intuition, for this he expressly denies.l8 He maintains, 
and he says it is the doctrine of St. Thomas also, that man is "in this 
prssent life always soul united to body, and can perform no operations which 
are not conjointly operations of both. Not being a pure spirit, but spirit 
united to matter, -not being a pure intelligence, like the angels, but 
intelligence united to sense, - he can apprehend the intelligible only as 
united to the sensible, the spiritual only as united in some way to the 
material".19 And hence When Brownson accuses Kant of arbitrarily limiting 
experience to sensible objects, he means, simply, that Kant arbitrarily denie 
that man can attain to a knowledge of anything but the particular and the 
contingent; while Brownson contends that experience teaches that we can attai 
also to a knowledge of the universal and necessary. 
And with this explanation it is easy to understand Brownson's final 
criticism of Kant. namely. that Kant's problem, "How are synthetic judgments 
~ priori formed?" was raised in consequence of a misapprehension. For 
Kant's problem consisted precisely in this: "how can I add the ~priori 
r 
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element to the empirice.l element in knowledge?" In other words, in a prop-
osition like the following: "Everything which happens has a cause", the 
conception of Cause is entirely different from "something happens", and, 
moreover, indicates something altogether different than "everything whiCh 
happens"; how, then, from "everything happens", do I attain to a conception 
entirely different from it, namely, causality? And what is more important 
still, since the causality is different from "everything which happens", how 
do I come to know that the conception of causality is necessarily connected 
with something that happens? How can I ever unite cause and effect, that is, 
relate causality with effeotibility, and know that everything which happens 
must have a cause? That is Kant's precise problem as understood by Brownson.~ 
Brownson's answer to the problem is simplicity itself: There is and 
can be no such problem. For we experience the ideal, the general, the 
universal just as really and as certainly as we experience the particular and 
the individual; and if the cause is united or is present in the effect, we 
always experience, however obscurely, the cause along with the effect, the 
noumenon with the phenomonen. And hence the problem of uniting the universal 
and the individual, the cause and the effect in the judgment, does not occur; 
for they are united in my judgment because they are ontologically united and 
I experience one in conjunction with the other.21 That is, the intelligible 
world, for Brownson, is not altogether removed from the sensible; the cause is 
~ot completely separated from the effect; and the noumenon is not disjointed 
~rom the phenomenon. Rather the cause is in the effect, the necessary is in 
the contingent, in the sense that it may be discovered, however obscurely, 
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therein. We can prove the existence of God, then, Who is the cause while 
the universe is the effect, because the cause is always revealed and discov-
erable in the effect. But God, in this world is never apprehended by Himself 
alone, but only in conjunction with the apprehension of his effects. And 
hence in order to contemplate ~intelligible by Himself, we must separate 
the intelligible from the sensible phenomena with which it is presented. 
Brownson's conclusion, as is evident from what we have said, is that 
Kant makes no positive contribution to philosophy because of his false start-
ing point. For, as he pointed out, in every investigation the inevitable 
assumption is that we know. Any other assumed starting point is false and 
cannot be consistently maintained, and must, therefore, lead to all kinds of 
absurdities, including the denial of genuine science. 
Hence the psychological point of departure does not and cannot suffice 
for an explanation of science, or for anything else for that matter. That 
is, in order to have a true Doctrine of Life or a true Doctrine of Science, 
we cannot begin with the subject alone, but we must start with things them-
selves. And hence an analysis of mental phenomena alone will explain neither 
how we know or why we know under this form rather than that. For such an 
explanation it is necessary "to go to ontology, to things themselves, I see 
things because they are; and under this or that form because they so exist 
objectively in re".22 
--
But since an answer to the fundrumental questions of knowledge requires a 
Doctrine of Life, to which, as we pointed out above, Kant never attained. 
And he could not have a Doctrine of Life because he would not.accept the 
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guidance of Divine Revelation. And hence it is fundamentally because Kant 
would not rise to the comprehension of the Christian Theology that Brownson 
concludes as he does: 
There may be depths in the Critic we have not 
sounded, diamonds that we have not discovered; but 
we have sounded w the depth of our line, and we 
have searched diligently for the gems which might 
be concealed at the bottom; but, alas, we have 
found nothine but bald athei~ and cold, heartless 
scepticism, erected into a system bearing all the 
imposing forms of science. We have labored to re-
fute its fundamental principles, because we believe 
them adopted by large numbers who have never read 
Kant himself, and because we would do what we can 
to atone for our ow.n former philosophical and 
theological errors, and aid as we can in recalling 
the age to a religious philosophy, in consonance 
with the profound mysteries of the Christian faith. 
We hope we have not labored in vain.23 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV 
lcritique,, p. 41. 
2works, I, P• 201. 
3compare, for example, the following in Kant 1 "As, in thinking in general, we 
take no account of the relation of our thoughts to any object (whether of 
sense or of the pure understanding), what is called (1) the synthesis of 
the conditions of a thought in general, is not objective at all, but only a 
synthesis of thought with the subject, which synthesis is wrongly taken for 
the synthetical representation of an object. • •• without a previous 
intuition, no category by itself can give me a concept of an object, for by 
intuition alone the object is given, which afterwards is thought in accord-
ance with a category ••• "(Underscoring added). Again, "I have really no 
~wledge whatever of the object, but only of my concept which I make to 
myself of something in general, that is incapable of any real intuition". 
Critique, PP• 321-22-23. He says also that we know the categories only, and 
it is only through the categories that we know things, Ibid., P• 324. 
4nThen I cannot ask Whether the tree does or does not ex~independently of 
my beholding it; for, independently of my beholding it, that is, of my 
intuition of it, it is to me no object of conception" Works, I, P• 187. 
5compare Brownson's view with the followi.nga "It remains completely unknown 
to us what objects may be by themselves and apart from the receptivity of 
our senses. We know nothing but our manner of perceiving them, that manner 
being peculiar to us, and not necessarily shared in by every being, though, 
no doubt by every human being" Critique, P• 34. 
6cf. the following in Kanta "The matter only of all phenomena is given us 
~ losteriori;nbut their form must be ready for them in the mind (Gemuth) ~ 
pr ori •••• Critique, P• 16. 
~ence his second great positive doctrine, that on which he founds his claim 
to originality, namely that the form of the thought (intuition and oonceptio 
or the form under which the object is cognized, is derived from the subject; 
never, as metaphysicians had hitherto fancied, from the object" Works, I, 
P• 187. 
8compare with the following of Kant: "General but pure logic has to deal wi 
principles ~priori only, and is a canon of the understanding and of reason, 
though with reference to its formal application only, irrespective of any 
contents, whether empirical or transcendental" Critique, PP• 42-43. 
9critique, P• 58. Brownson has no quarrel with the number or exactness of th 
categories; however he remarks that from the viewpoint of logic they might 
be reduced to subject and predicate; from the standpoint of ontology to 
"being and phenomenon, or with M. Cousin, Substance and Cause". But, as he 
points out, this question has only a remote connection with o~ present 
Purpose", and hence he dismisses the question. Cf. Works, I, P• 202. Of' It' 
Cousin's reduction, upon which he looks so favorably at present, he says 
later a "M. Cousin prides himself on this reduction of the categories, and 
regards it as his chief claim to originality as a metaphysician; but, though 
we own we were simple enough to be taken in with it, we consider it the rock 
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on Which he split, and the source of his failure" Works, VI, P• 107. 
lOit must be remembered here that Brownson has already presented arguments 
to show that Kant's theory is not only incapable of proof. but destructive o 
all science. His own positive proof that forms of thought are objective 
follows here; it differs from the previous argument because the former 
argument dealt with the effects of a system of categories; that is. grant-
ing categories. what effect would they have on knowledge? Works. I. P• 
203. 
llworks. I, P• 204. 
l2"'What is that which investigates. the intelligent me. What is that which 
is investigated. the intelligent me. The me is me!Uld always equal to it-
self. The subject and the object-are the s~e. and absolutely indistin-
guishable. But if so, the me investigating equals the me investigated, • • 
• • But certainly the object investigated is distinguishable from the sub-
ject investigating, by this fact, at least, that it is investigated, while 
the subject investigates. But the me equals me, according to our postulate 
and therefore can in no sense whatever be distinguished from itself. Con-
sequently, the me can never be its own object. Consequently, again. it is 
not the living SUbjective faculty of intelligence, that Kant is really 
analyzing.~ Works, I, P• 204. 
l~orks. PP• 294-205. 
l~"For, again, if the me, as Kant himself agrees cannot observe itself as 
object, but only indirectly as subject, it follows necessarily. that it 
cannot observe its forms as object, for its forms are indistinguishable 
from itself. Just so certain, therefore, as we see objects at all, just 
so certain is it that the forms under which we see them are object, and not 
subject" Works, I, p.206. 
~cause a negative form is subjective, that is to say, a form which is mere 
ly privative, we are not at liberty to say a positive form. in ~iCh there 
is that not in the object. is also subjective. Consequently, the conces-
sions as to negative forms, or inadequate conceptions, do not invalidate 
the argument" Works. I, P• 207. 
l 6ttwith both (Kant and Hume) empiricism and sensism are synonymous. Neither 
admits the capacity of the soul to have experience of intelligible objects 
(Noemena) but both confine it strictly to sensible objects (Aistneemata 
and Phantasmata) 
l7The doctrine of the reality of ideas, of the true, the beautiful, and the 
good, is a true doctrine; and that we have real experience of ideas. object 
ively, as much so as of sensible objects, is. we hold, an unquestionable 
fact; but it is only in the category of the phenomenon, of the effect. the 
particular. the contingent, that we cognize them. But as the idealis always 
in the actual, so in the intuition of the actual we have intuition of the 
ideal. viorks, I, P• 211. 
18vide, note 17 above; cr. also, the following: "we must, however, ••• be-
~ of the error of the mystics and exclusive spiritualists who will have 
it that we can attain to the intelligible world immediately. that we can 
rise to cognition of cause without the medium of the effect" Works,I.p.2ll. 
r 
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19works, I, p. 287. 
20cr. Works, PP• 209-211. 
2lwe must bear in mind the explanation given above concerning Brownson's use 
of the term experience. 
22works, I, P• 213. 
23Works, I, P• 213. 
Conclusion 
We have summarized the essential points of Brownson's criticimn of Kant 
as contained in his various essays. What shall we now say of Brownson htm-
self as a critic of Kant? Since he was a reviewer by profession, he had 
established an ideal which he, as a reviewer, had striven to attain. And 
so, in rendering a verdict on Brownson as a Critic of Kant, it is fitting 
~hat we do so in the light of the critical principles Brownson himself stated 
so admirably: 
"We hold that in refuting an author it is our duty to 
reproduce his doctrine, at least so far as we intend 
to make it the subject of comment, as he holds it in 
his own mind, and so far explain it that our readers 
may see the truth which he has misconceived and mis-
applied. There is no other honest way of dealing with 
an author's system, or rendering our discussions of 
erroneous systems of any advantage to the· truth. To 
cite passages from an author which verbally contradict 
our own doctrines, and then pronounce him a fool, a 
sophist, a man whose God is darkness, not light, is 
not becoming the dignity of philosophical discussion. 
Hegel did not profess to be an Atheist, or a pantheist; 
he denied that he was either. We have no right to 
suppose that he did not intend to avoid both, and that 
if he has fallen into either error he has been deceived. 
The proper way to treat him is to point out the source 
of his deception, and to show what in his principles 
or method has misled him. We have no right to treat 
otherwise such a man as Hegel, certainly one of the 
master minds of modern Germany. Pere Gratry has not 
so treated him, and it is almost impossible tram his 
citations to comprehend Hegel•s error."l 
But, as we have noted at the conclusion of nearly every chapter, Brown-
son never really entered into the mind and spirit of the Critique, and thus 
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he did not criticise it in the light of the Kantian syste~ Rather, he 
continually forced problems of his own making upon Kant. For at the very out 
set he studied Kant only in the light ot a rather arbitrary system of class-
ification, and hence mutilated, so to speak~ the doctrine of Kant so that he 
c~uld classify it into his own systems. 
Moreover, the criticism Brownson aims at Pere Gratry might very well ap-
ply to Brownson himself: "For Kant did not profess to be an Idealist or a 
Sceptic, but he denied that he was either. We have no right to suppose that 
he did not intend to avoid both ••• •" Hence, quite obviously Brownson 
had no right to criticise Kant as an Idealist or as a Sceptic, but he should 
have entered into the spirit of the critical philosophy. For the same reason 
then, Brownson had no right to force Kant into his own doctrine of Substance 
and the consequences flowing therefrom. 
The tact that Brownson never really entered into the spirit of the 
critical philosophy is evinced most graphically, we think, by the fact that 
Brownson so frequently condemned the entire Critique because of its starting 
point. For example, the whole Critique was founded in a capital blundsr 
and could end in no solid or useful result because Kant, supposedly, had 
tried to establish the veracity of man's cognitive faculties. Hence, from 
the outset Kant could not contribute anything worthwhile to philosophy. 
Moreover, the entire Kantian edifice was again destroyed from another point 
of view: Kant could never attain to truth because he would not be guided 
by Christian Theology. And then the Kantian system as a whole was destroyed 
from yet another anglea its pernicious view of substance inevitably leads to 
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absurdities~ such as the impossibility of anything but accidental differences 
in beings. Moreover~ from the erroneous notion of substance there also arose 
the perverted view that there could be a real distinction of faculties £rom 
the soul; and hence~ building his Critique upon that foundation, Brownson 
destroyed the entire edifice once more by showing that foundation to be made 
of sand. And so Brownson really attempted to demolish the whole Ka.ntian 
philosophy from every point of view that he treated it. 
Furthermore, his treatment of Kant is professedly incomplete, for he 
treats only of the first two o£ Kant's three divisions. And he really never 
entered into what might be termed a formal treatment of the categories. but 
merely concerned himself with the effects of such a system of categories; 
that is, the consequences £lowing from sucha system. 
But, as Brownson remarks again, nthe great aim o£ the generous and noble 
minded Catholic critic is to recognize what there is in his author that is 
true and good, worthy o£ commendation, and to pass lightly over small or 
incidental errors~ £or our great work is not so much to avoid errors as to 
bring out and appropriate truth".2 And hence~ Whatever else may be said o£ 
Brownson, he certainly attempted to treat thoroughly every phase of the 
Critique which he wrote about. For example, he tried to traoe the starting 
point o£ Kant through the entire modern philosophy baok to its "£ather"• 
Descartes. And hence he attempted to trace every error of Kant to its 
ultimate source in order to show precisely what it was that misled and deceivE-
ed him; and then he tried to establish what he considered to be the true 




And if Brownson was so thorough as we noted above, he was equally care-
ful to be honest with Kant and to grasp his system as Kant held it in his 
own mind. We say he tried to treat Kant thus, but, however much our respect 
and admiration for Brownson may be, we must admit that he did not succeed in 
his endeavor. But that he did not purposely misrepresent Kant we hold to be 
unquestionable, and may be evinced in part, at least, by the followinga 
"We have aimed to comprehend his doctrine, (Xant•s), aimed to set it forth 
correctly, and to meet it fairly. If we have done him any injustice, it has 
been unintentional".3 
Moreover, if "we are to recognize What there is in an author that is 
true and good, worthy of col!llllendation," we must not forget that throughout 
his criticism, Brownson has consistently maintained that the only real start-
ing point of philosophy is in ontology or in things themselves; that, (in 
Brownson's language) the ontological, not the psychological, is the only valic 
point of departure in philosophya "The truth is that {Kant• s problem} is 
inexplicable from the purely psychological point of view, and nothing proves 
it better than the abortive attempts of Hume and Kant, both men of the highes 
order of metaphysical genius, and either of 111hom would have explained it, had 
it been explicable by the method adopted. We have said more than once, that 
science or knowing, is inexplicable psychologically. Every psychologist 
inevitably, if he pushes his principles to their last conclusions, ends in 
scepticism".4 
Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to render an absolute verdict on 
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Brownson as a critic of Kant, because,quite obviously, that criticism is 
based upon his own metaphysical system, and hence his arguments stand or fall 
with his metaphysics. And since it has been impossible for us to refute or 
establish his whole philosophy, we can only say that his arguments appear 
sound within his own system. His refutation of Kant is presented clearly 
and follows logically from the principles with which he begins, and are con-
clusive against the Kantian system as he understood it. 
We must not forget, either, that in judging an author our primary con-
sideration must be to discover whether or not he had attained the end and 
purpose of his criticism. Now Brovr.nson criticised the philosophy of Kant 
because, even prior to his conversion to Catholicism, he recognized that Kant' 
philosophy is incompatible with Divine Revelation. He saw Kant's system as 
the enemy of the Church, and hence labored to refute it and to warn others of 
the dangers hidden therein. And more than that he recognized the fact that 
the philosopher must accept the guidance of Christian Theology; that nothing 
is more in accord with his rational nature than an acceptance of Revelation, 
and nothing more irrational than for a philosopher to turn his back upon 
revelation and to construct his system without it. Whether or not to wnat 
extent he succeeded in establishing these points, it is, of course, impossible 
to determine. But since his review, (at the time he wrote these articles}, 
was one of the most popular in the country, it is safe to say that he had 
exerted a great deal of influence against Kantianism in America. And if he 
succeeded in lessening the influence of Kant he achieved the end he set out 
to attain, and thus "he has not labored in vain". 
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And finally. because he was a reviewer. we hope that the reader will givE 
Brownson the consideration he so often gave to his fellow-editors: "A ••• 
reviewer. obliged to publish at stated periods, often compelled to write in 
haste. and to publish his article before giving it its last finish, may 
rightfully demand a charitable construction of his language, and that the 
reader give it an orthodox meaning Whenever it is by any means possible, 
without absolute violence. to do so".s 
lworks, I, P• 367. 
2works, XX, P• 294. 
3Works, I, P• 213. 
~orks, I, p. 210. 
SWorks, XIX, P• 242. 
FOOTNOTES OF THE CONCLUSION 
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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 
Orestes A. Brownson: 
Born 18o3 
Became a Prespyterian 1822 
Became a Universalistic Minister 1826 
Married Sally Healy 1827 
Edited the Gospel Advocate 1828 
Became a follower of Fanny Wright and Robert Owen 1829 
Became a Sceptic 1829-1830 
Preached as an Independent Minister 1831 
Became a Unitarian Minister 1832 
Wrote Charles Elwood or the Infidel Converted 1834 
Joined the Transcendentalists 1836 
Founded the Church of the Future 1836 
Edited the Boston Reformer 1836 
Founded the Boston quarterlz Review 1838 
Published !!!! Laboring Classes 1840 
Connected with Brooks F~ 1842 
Published the Mediatorial Life of Jesus 1842 
Became Contributing Editor of the Demooratioe Review 1843 
Founded Brownson's gparterly Review 1844 
Converted to Catholicism October 20. 1844 
Essays on Kant published 1844 
Published ~ Spirit Rapper 1854 
Published~ Convert; or, Leaves ~!(~erience 1857 
Ended ~Brownson quarterly Review 1864 
Published The American Republic: Its Constitution, 
Tindencies and Destinies--
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